Cleaning up and invigorating the civil service

Abstract

Reliable quantitative estimates are not available of: (1) the quality of civil service performance and changes therein as the result of development projects, or (2) the importance of civil service performance for various development outcomes. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence indicates that in some countries government performance has indeed collapsed, with calamitous effects on development. Although poor government performance is theoretically overdetermined—there are many possible causes, which we cannot disentangle in practice—a plausible story can be told based on institutional economics, using such concepts as information, incentives, and credible commitment. This version of both problems and solutions is supported by examples of successful reforms. The article argues that “institutional adjustment’ deserves more consideration as a basis for reforms. Two practical examples are discussed in some detail: improving incentives in the public sector and strategies to combat corruption. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients

“…(1). Moreover, African aid recipients are particularly vulnerable to institutional destruction from "poaching" and by-passing government, due to a short history of self-government, limited supplies of skilled labor, low incomes and public sector salaries, low foreign investment and high aid levels (Morss, 1984;Berg, 1997;Klitgaard, 1997;O'Connell and Soludo, 2001;Brautigam and Knack, 2004). 26 Fragmentation is highly significant in this sample of Sub-Saharan African countries, with a coefficient in Eq.…”

Understanding the Linkage among Public Procurement (PP), Corruption, and Tax Morale (TM) Through Agency Theory (AT): A Review

“…Sandholtz and Koetzle (1998) An illegal or unauthorized transfer of money or inkind substitute (describing corruption payment as bribe) Schleifer and Vishny (1993) The sale by government officials of government property for personal gain Klitgaard (1997) gives an equation for explaining corruption as a phenomena:…”

Corruption and Policy Implementation in the Philippines: A Comparative Analysis of the Teacher Training and Textbook Delivery Programmes

“…Combining Chase's obstacles of implementation (1979) with Van Meter and Van Horn's (1975) elements of implementation, these are grouped into three broad analytical constructs of corruption taken from Klitgaard (1997), namely, monopoly opportunities (or lack of opportunities), discretion compliance (or non-compliance) and accountability incentives (or disincentives).…”