2004
DOI: 10.1080/0140239042000232765
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Clausewitz and Low-Intensity Conflict

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Cited by 36 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…We can still read with profit Thucydides's brilliant, if dangerously unique, account of the great war between Athens and Sparta. Similarly, contrary to the claims of some scholars (Honig, 1997;Kaldor, 1999;van Creveld, 1991), Clausewitz composed a general theory of war that fits all periods, all character of belligerents, and all technological and social contexts (Bassford, 1994;Gray, forthcoming;Kinross, 2004).…”
Section: Alas Some Fatal Flawsmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…We can still read with profit Thucydides's brilliant, if dangerously unique, account of the great war between Athens and Sparta. Similarly, contrary to the claims of some scholars (Honig, 1997;Kaldor, 1999;van Creveld, 1991), Clausewitz composed a general theory of war that fits all periods, all character of belligerents, and all technological and social contexts (Bassford, 1994;Gray, forthcoming;Kinross, 2004).…”
Section: Alas Some Fatal Flawsmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…En todo caso, los conflictos de baja intensidad no han sido lo suficientemente estudiados, lo que ha provocado que su evolución sea lenta y desproporcionada. Esta deficiencia de estudios estratégicos al respecto tiene una influencia muy notoria de los postulados de Clausewitz, dada la naturaleza de la guerra, los medios para el desarrollo de esa estrategia y, finalmente, los choques masivos de fuerzas armadas organizadas (Kinross, 2004). Según Francisco Pineda (1996):…”
Section: Guerras De Baja Intensidad O Low Intensity Conflictunclassified
“…Although we would expect large-scale disaster events to lead to an immediate outcry for international aid, governments involved in LIC settings may have the opposite reaction, minimising the need for aid to keep ‘foreign influences’ out (Kinross 2004). Indeed, as the legitimacy of the state is already internally under threat (Ghani & Lockhart 2009), humanitarian actors’ access may be fraught by contradictions between a national government claiming sovereign control over the response and the desire of international agencies to safeguard a neutral and independent space for humanitarian action.…”
Section: Disasters In Times Of Political Turmoilmentioning
confidence: 99%