Classifying Ecuador's Regime under Correa: A Procedural Approach

Abstract

This article presents the case for steering clear of electoral outcome-based regime classifications. It advocates focusing instead on the systemic character of the formal and informal institutions that govern access to power as a more appropriate way to draw electoral regime boundaries. The case study of Ecuador under the presidency of Rafael Correa is offered as an example of this approach. Both electoral outcomes under Correísmo (2006-2017) as well as the procedural context in which elections occurred are examined. But the regime is here analyzed and categorized on a procedural-centered basis. The analysis of the slope of the playing field in the electoral arena reveals that political competition was fundamentally unfair, placing the regime in the competitive authoritarian category. This conclusion is reached on grounds of the incumbent's capture of the electoral management body, as well as highly discriminatory electoral laws drawn by the incumbent, among many other factors that rendered Ecuadorean electoral contests unfair.

Partisanship and Autocratization: Polarization, Power Asymmetry, and Partisan Social Identities in Turkey

“…3 Although there is limited research comparing levels of political polarization across democracies and hybrid regimes that emerged through gradual autocratization, existing works show relatively high political polarization in the latter. For example, Handlin (2018) compares eight Latin American countries with regard to the level of affective and ideological polarization during the last decade, and finds that the most polarized countries were Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela, all of which experienced a growing power asymmetry between the ruling party and the opposition over the tenures of Correa, Morales, and Chavez, respectively (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013; Mainwaring, 2012; Sanchez-Sibony, 2017). Democratic erosion in Turkey also unfolded under high polarization.…”

When Does Backsliding Lead to Breakdown? Uncertainty and Opposition Strategies in Democracies at Risk

“…These attacks against countervailing institutions were not "tussles" (Waldner and Lust 2018). They were significant power-grabs that damaged Ecuadorian democracy and created an uneven political playing field, akin to what Levitsky and Way (2002) would call a competitive authoritarian regime (see also Levitsky and Loxton 2013;Sanchez-Sibony 2017).…”

Understanding the use of recall referendums: Evidence from Ecuador

“…Our work seeks to contribute to the understanding of recall referendum practices by broadening the focus – beyond citizen attitudes, institutional designs, and partisan interests – in order to include the role of Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs). The role played by an electoral institution should not be assumed to be neutral and fair by default , specially in contexts of low quality of democracy and or under populist regimes, where these institutions are quite often used to promote government cronies and punish critics and opponents (Sánchez Sibony, 2017). Then, the competences given to an EMB by law, combined with its level of autonomy (from the government and or a political party), is key to understand the working of recall as well as other mechanisms of direct democracy.…”

“…Several aspects of the electoral reforms promoted by President Correa were identified as ways of undermining the freedom and fairness of future elections (Conaghan, 2015). According to Sánchez-Sibony (2017), amendments were easily enacted because the EMB was captured by the government. The new constitution approved in 2008 created two new branches of government, one of them being Transparency and Social Control.…”

“…The most evident case was the selection of the five CNE members. Before 2011 it had been made up of representatives of the largest political parties, but from 2011 only members with close links to the government of the Citizen’s Revolution were added (Ospina, 2013: 151; Sánchez-Sibony, 2017: 133–134).…”