Class voting and Left–Right party positions: A comparative study of 15 Western democracies, 1960–2005

Jansen, Giedo; Evans, Geoffrey; Graaf, Nan Dirk de

doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.09.007

Cited by 115 publications

(77 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Concretely, we would expect that anti-elite parties: (1) make decisions (as well as expressing opinions) easier because they radically simplify political questions; (2) emphasise stark differences between parties and thereby illustrate the relevance of party choice; (3) translate diffuse frustrations about the political system into concrete arguments and demands and thereby restore a sense of political agency; (4) stimulate emotions of anger and indignation which typically have a mobilising effect; and (5) dramatise politics with their confrontational style, which could make it more exciting and entertaining for relatively disinterested citizens. Although they usually do not differentiate by income, many studies suggest that polarisation makes it is easier for citizens to connect their preferences to parties (Dalton 2010;Jansen et al 2013;Lachat 2008;Lupu 2015) and to participate in politics (Dalton 2008;Moral 2017;Steiner & Martin 2012;Wilford 2017; for a critical view, see Rogowski 2014). Although they usually do not differentiate by income, many studies suggest that polarisation makes it is easier for citizens to connect their preferences to parties (Dalton 2010;Jansen et al 2013;Lachat 2008;Lupu 2015) and to participate in politics (Dalton 2008;Moral 2017;Steiner & Martin 2012;Wilford 2017; for a critical view, see Rogowski 2014).…”

Section: Can Anti-elite Rhetoric Decrease Income Gaps In Efficacy?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 The first two mechanisms link back to the polarisation literature. Although they usually do not differentiate by income, many studies suggest that polarisation makes it is easier for citizens to connect their preferences to parties (Dalton 2010;Jansen et al 2013;Lachat 2008;Lupu 2015) and to participate in politics (Dalton 2008;Moral 2017;Steiner & Martin 2012;Wilford 2017; for a critical view, see Rogowski 2014). Moreover, it is often argued that groups with on average lower political sophistication and attention (such as the poor) benefit disproportionately from a diverse and stimulating party system (Dalton 2010;Smidt 2017).…”

Section: Can Anti-elite Rhetoric Decrease Income Gaps In Efficacy?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Anti‐elite parties and political inequality: How challenges to the political mainstream reduce income gaps in internal efficacy

Marx

Nguyen

2018

European J Political Res

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There is growing interest in political inequality across income groups. This article contributes to this debate with two arguments about political involvement: poverty depresses internal political efficacy by undermining cognitive and emotional resources; and dissent in the party system reduces the efficacy gap to higher incomes. Specifically, conflict is to be expected between anti‐elite and mainstream parties to simplify political decisions and stimulate political attention among poor voters. These arguments are supported with comparative and experimental analyses. Comparative survey data shows that the income gap in efficacy varies with a novel measure of the anti‐elite salience in the party system. The causal impact of anti‐elite rhetoric is established though a representative survey experiment. Finally, the article investigates how these mechanisms affect both electoral and other forms of political participation.

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Section: Can Anti-elite Rhetoric Decrease Income Gaps In Efficacy?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Can Anti-elite Rhetoric Decrease Income Gaps In Efficacy?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Anti‐elite parties and political inequality: How challenges to the political mainstream reduce income gaps in internal efficacy

Marx

Nguyen

2018

European J Political Res

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“…More specifically, we focus on three sets of factors potentially related to origin weights: public policies (redistribution, social expenditure, market inequality), economic affluence and political mobilization (union density and party polarization). Redistribution (Model 1) is measured as the relative difference between market inequality and post-transfers and taxes inequality (Eurostat 2016b,c; Solt 2016); social expenditure (Model 2) is measured as the ratio of social expenditure over GDP (Eurostat 2016a); market inequality (Model 3) is measured by the Gini index before taxes and transfers (Eurostat 2016c; Solt 2016); economic affluence (Model 4) is measured by GDP per capita (logged) (World Bank 2016); union density (Model 5) is measured as the proportion of wage earners who are members of unions (Visser 2016), and party polarization (Model 6) is measured as the average distance between policy positions of parties in the country weighted by their share of the vote (Jansen, Evans and de Graaf 2013). Data to estimate policy positions is taken from Party Manifesto (Volkens et al 2016).…”

Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social mobility and demand for redistribution in Europe: a comparative analysis

Castillo

Marqués-Perales

2018

British Journal of Sociology

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The literature on preferences for redistribution has paid little attention to the effect of social mobility on the demand for redistribution and no systematic test of the hypotheses connecting social mobility and preferences for redistribution has yet been done to date. We use the diagonal reference model to estimate the effect of origin and destination classes on preferences for redistribution in a large sample of European countries using data from the European Social Survey. Our findings are consistent with the logic of acculturation in the sense that newcomers tend to adapt their views to those of the destination class at early stages and that upward and downward mobility do not have distinctive effects on the formation of political preferences. However, even though social origins seem to have a limited impact on preferences for redistribution, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that mobile and non-mobile individuals are alike. We also find that the effect of social origin on preferences varies largely across countries. The empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that the effect of social origin on preferences for redistribution increases in contexts of strong familism.

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“…Bartolini and Mair, 1990;Kriesi, 1998;Lipset and |Rokkan, 1967;Knutsen 1995a,b;Jansen, Evans & De Graaf, 2013). According to Huber and Inglehart (1995), in most countries the primary dimension of conflict seems to be the economic left-right cleavage.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Left-right ideology: Its meaning and effects on party preferences in Serbia

Todosijević¹

2016

Soc pregled

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Summary: Left-right ideology is regarded as an expression of socio-economic divisions. More recently, it has expanded to incorporate orientations such as nationalism or postmaterialism, and relaxed its association with social structure. Furthermore, the meaning of the political left and right varies across political contexts. As a result it is questionable to what extent left-right labels can successfully function as heuristic devices for political orientation. In order to understand the meaning of the left-right ideological dimension in a specific IntroductionConcepts of political left and right are some of the most central political notions, especially in the European context. Political journalism, common political discourse, and academic literature could hardly be conceived without these labels. They appear necessary to describe political ideologies and movements, events, political parties and actors, and other political phenomena. Political left and right are labels used for self-description as well. Individuals and groups often describe their views and preferences in terms of left and right (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990;Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976). These concepts serve a number of functions -political communication, orientation, and self-description. Leftright dimension also serves as a 'cognitive short-cut', that can help the public to articulate their preferences, including selecting a party to vote for at elections, with minimal cognitive effort.In order to perform these functions, an ideological dimension, or a set of ideological labels, needs to satisfy certain basic conditions (Todosijević, 2004). First, the public should be willing and able to use this dimension for self-description. Second, this self-labeling should be systematically related to important social and political variables. In case of the left-right dimension, this should include socio-demographic characteristics, for instance (Freire, 2008). Finally, ideological labels are useful in political orientation if they are related to political party preferences. These issues are addressed in the present paper, focusing on one particular case -Serbia. First, I examine the distribution of the left-right self placement among Serbian respondents. Next, I look into the relationships between the left-right self-placement and some of the basic socio-demographic variables. Finally, the relationships between the left-right ideology and party preferences are analyzed.Although the intellectual traditions that gave birth to the left-right ideological discourse are located in Western Europe, the terminology gained a more global significance. Yet, the use of the left-right terminology varies both in the extent and content (e.g., Zechmeister, 2006). Apparently, the more a polity is distant from the West-European tradition, the less these concepts appear politically meaningful. The content of the dimension also varies, not only geographically but also in time. 2 Given its extensiveness and variability, the meaning and function of the left-right ideological la...

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Class voting and Left–Right party positions: A comparative study of 15 Western democracies, 1960–2005

Cited by 115 publications

References 48 publications

Anti‐elite parties and political inequality: How challenges to the political mainstream reduce income gaps in internal efficacy

Anti‐elite parties and political inequality: How challenges to the political mainstream reduce income gaps in internal efficacy

Social mobility and demand for redistribution in Europe: a comparative analysis

Left-right ideology: Its meaning and effects on party preferences in Serbia

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