Clarke Against Spinoza on the Manifest Diversity of the World

Abstract

Samuel Clarke was one of Spinoza's earliest and fiercest opponents in England. I uncover three related Clarkean arguments against Spinoza's metaphysic that deserve more attention from readers today. Collectively, these arguments draw out a tension at the very heart of Spinoza's rationalist system. From the conjunction of a necessary being who acts necessarily and the principle of sufficient reason, Clarke reasons that there could be none of the diversity we find in the universe. In doing so, Clarke potentially reveals an inconsistent triad in Spinoza. Responses to this inconsistency map onto a deep division in the contemporary Spinoza literature. I conclude that Clarke's arguments provide a new approach to the recently revived debate over acosmic interpretations of Spinoza and point to new interpretive possibilities.

Clarke, Samuel

“…Throughout his writings, Clarke repeatedly expressed commitment to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Clarke employed the PSR in his influential argument for God and also in the related arguments against Spinoza's metaphysics (Rowe 1998, Schliesser 2012, Yenter 2014. Clarke and Leibniz both accepted the principle of sufficient reason and applied it widely.…”