Clarifying the Relationship between Values and Moral Judgement

Abstract

An investigation of the relationship between values and moral judgement was conducted using 124 Australian university students. Participants completed a Value Survey and the Defining Issues Test in sessions one week apart. Data were analysed by computing correlations and multiple regression of ratings for individual values and Value Type scores with Stage Scores and summary scores of moral reasoning. Analysis confirmed only some of the predicted relationships between values and the moral reasoning measure and indicated some that had not been predicted. Theoretical and psychometric factors contributing to these results are discussed, and the importance of identifying the conceptual bases of measures used in moral behaviour research is noted.

Responsible tourist motivation: how valuable is the Schwartz value survey?

“…This concurs with Feather's (1994) assertion that while moral behaviour involves an increased emphasis on the universal values of tolerance and appreciation, it necessitates a reduced commitment to the conservation values of conformity, security and tradition. Likewise, it also supports Mayton and Furnham (1994), Ostini and Ellerman (1997) and Shaw et al (2005) who argue that those with strong universalism values have less affinity with the values type of conformity, tradition and security. In addition, there is no indication of the presence of the power value type, as originally defined by Schwartz (1992, p. 6), where he noted power to be concerned with '.…”

“…The values of hedonism, security and power were negatively related to activism, while universalism and self-direction were positively related, with activists demonstrating concern for the enhancement of others and an acceptance of diversity (Mayton & Furnham, 1994). Similarly, Ostini and Ellerman (1997) argue moral reasoning to be motivated by principle rather than conformity to authority, tolerance rather than tradition, benevolence rather than security and hedonism, and a general orientation to others rather than self. Likewise, moral judgement stems from individuals' emphases on harmony, reason and tolerance and a reduced commitment to the values of conformity and tradition (Feather, 1994).…”

“…However, it has also attracted criticism for its lack of applicability to ethical contexts (see Ostini & Ellerman, 1997;Shaw et al, 2005). For example, in research with ethical shoppers, whilst universalism values were most important, and power, tradition and spirituality least important, Shaw et al (2005) argued the SVS needed to incorporate three additional values to fully explain ethical consumer motivation -capitalism (control and dominance of multinationals) and consumer power (the impact of purchase decisions), both within the power domain, and a universalism value -animal welfare (protection for the welfare of all animals).…”

An exploration of values in ethical consumer decision making

“…Ethical decision making and moral judgments also comprise an area where values research can make a contribution, as evidenced in the work undertaken by Ostini and Ellerman (1997). As commented by Ostini and Ellerman (1997), however, although the Schwartz Value Survey can be used as a basis for research, no specific list of values exists for ethical or moral decision making based on this instrument. As is evident from the above discussion, given the increasing importance of ethical concerns among some sectors of consumer society, there has been limited application of the Schwartz Value Survey within specific contexts.…”

Not moral “reasoning”: A Libertarian – Communitarian dimension of moral orientation and Schwartz's value types

“…More recently, Ostini and Ellerman (1997) examined the relationships between the Schwartz (1992) 10 value types, DIT P scores and DIT D scores (the D score is similar to the SROM moral maturity score or the Global Score from the MJI). Ostini and Ellerman found a significant correlation between the value Equality and P scores (r = .32) and significant correlations between D scores and the values A Spiritual Life (r = .35) and Pleasure (r = -.32), although no significant correlations were observed between any value type and P scores or D scores.…”