Clan games

Potters, J.A.M.; Poos, René; Tijs, S.H.; Muto, Shigeo

doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90013-4

Cited by 50 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The class of clan games was introduced by Potters, Poos, Tijs and Muto (1989) to model social interaction between a "powerful" coalition of players (the clan) and "powerless" players (nonclan members). Economic applications of such games include bankruptcy problems, production economies, information acquisition and holding situations.…”

Section: Clan Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Economic applications of such games include bankruptcy problems, production economies, information acquisition and holding situations. Potters, Poos, Tijs and Muto (1989) …”

Section: Clan Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fourthly, this bankruptcy game is a clan game. By Theorem 2.1 in Potters, Poos, Tijs, Muto (1989), the bargaining set of this game coincides with the core and the shape of the core is defined as the set of imputations for which the "small" claimant 4 can expect at most 4 (see section 4 for details). Consequently, the core contains imputations where each strict subset of veto players are forced to null payoffs.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games

Béal

Durieu

Solal

2008

Mathematical Social Sciences

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Abstract. We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TUgames. Chwe (1994, p.318) notes that, in this context, it is difficult to prove nonemptiness of the largest consistent. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set. Moreover, the proof of this result allows to conclude that each TU-game has a farsighted stable set. We go further by providing a characterization of the collection of farsighted stable sets in TU-games. We also show that the farsighted core of a TU-game is empty or equal to the set of imputations of the game. Next, we study the relationships between the core and the largest consistent set in superadditive TU-games and in clan games. In the last section, we explore the stability of the Shapley value in superadditive TU-games. We show that the Shapley value is always a stable imputation. More precisely, if the Shapley value does not belong to the core, then it constitutes a farsighted stable set. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a superadditive TU-game to have the Shapley value in the largest consistent set.

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Section: Clan Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Economic applications of such games include bankruptcy problems, production economies, information acquisition and holding situations. Potters, Poos, Tijs and Muto (1989) …”

Section: Clan Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games

Béal

Durieu

Solal

2008

Mathematical Social Sciences

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“…The class of clan games was introduced by Potters et al (1989) to model social interaction between a "powerful"group of players (the clan) and "pow- total clan games were introduced as monotonic clan games whose subgames inherit the structure of the original (clan) game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Convex Games Versus Clan Games

Brânzei

Dimitrov

Tijs

2008

Int. Game Theory Rev.

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Convex Games versus Clan GamesBranzei, M.R.; Dimitrov, D.A.; Tijs, S.H. General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. AbstractIn this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic convex game generates a total clan game with zero worth for the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of the Weber set of the corresponding games.JEL Classi…cation: C71.

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“…Subclasses of the class of veto-rich gatnes have been studied by different authors : Big Boss games by Mtzto, Nakayama, Potters, and Tijs (1988) and Clan games by Potters, Poos, Tijs, and Muto (1989). In these papers many economic illustrations are presented.…”

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confidence: 99%

The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games

Arin

Feltkamp

1997

Int J Game Theory

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The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games Arin, J.; Feltkamp, V. Publication date: 1994 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA):Arin, J., & Feltkamp, V. (1994). The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1994-40). CentER. General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. May 2, 1994 AbstractThe process of computing the nucleolus of arbitrary transferable utility games is notoriously hard. A number of papers have appeared in which the nucleolus is computed by an algorithm in which either one or a huge number of huge linear programs have to be solved.We show that on the class of veto-rich games, the nucleolus is the unique kernel element. Veto-rich games are games in which one of the players is needed by coalitions in order to obtain a positive payoff. We then provide a fast algorithm which does not use linear programming techniques to compute the nucleolus on these games.Furthermore, we provide several examples of economic situations which belong to the class of veto-rich games and which are treated in the literature.

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Clan games

Cited by 50 publications

References 8 publications

Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games

Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games

Convex Games Versus Clan Games

The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games

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