Claiming control: cooperation with return as a condition for social benefits in Austria and the Netherlands

Abstract

Theoretically embedded in the migration/social policy nexus, this paper investigates cooperation with return (CWR) as a policy tool to remove practical deportation barriers for third-country nationals pending removal. Based on legal and policy documents and expert interviews with stakeholders in Austria and the Netherlands, the paper asks how CWR is implemented and what influence it has, both on migration control aims and on access to social rights. We argue that the politicization of the issue and diverging interests between policy networks of welfare and migration affect the regulation and implementation of the tool. By comparing the use of CWR within two country contexts, the analysis presented here adds valuable insights on features of governmental instruments in response to the “deportation gap”. The paper further adds to the literature on sanction-oriented, personalized migration policies.

Deserving Shelter: Conditional Access to Accommodation for Rejected Asylum Seekers in Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden

“…As a result, it is very difficult for NRAS to prove their cooperation. Rosenberger and Koppes (2018) conclude that the tool of cooperation "follows the stick-and-carrot idea: Cooperation with return is the stick; access to status and public services is the carrot. In contrast, non-cooperation is punished and usually leads to a denial of social benefits and/or to detention."…”

“…In the wake of an increase in asylum applications in European countries after 2015, the topic of NRAS has moved toward the center of political debates (Rosenberger & Koppes, 2018). Non-removed rejected asylum seekers are declared "undesirable" by national policy makers (Cantor et al, 2017).…”

“…The conditions for accessing the VBL are not specified in law or administrative decrees, but are drawn up as an administrative, internal guideline (Interview 4). Decisions about granting access to the VBL are made by case managers of the DT&V. There is room for individual decision-making, since it is difficult to objectively judge criteria like compliance and expected return (Rosenberger & Koppes, 2018). In one interview with an officer from the DT&V, the ample room for interpretation seems to have an inclusive effect (Interview 5).…”

“…The decision to grant or deny access to accommodation is made by federal government caseworkers who evaluate the cooperation activities and assess whether the individual is responsible for the lack of necessary documents (Interview 6). There is no clear definition of this condition (Rosenberger & Koppes, 2018), which grants the caseworker at the federal agency of migration (BFA) discretionary power. Notifying the provinces that a person is violating this duty to cooperate is considered grounds for dismissing a non-removed person from the reception system (ibid.).…”

Local responses in restrictive national policy contexts: welfare provisions for non-removed rejected asylum seekers in Amsterdam, Stockholm and Vienna

“…One such disagreement revolves around the issue of cooperation with return, which presents a condition for being granted access to the welfare support system. In case of alleged violation of the cooperation duty, the Federal Agency of Migration (BFA) requests that provinces dismiss the individual from the support system (Rosenberger and Koppes 2018). The FSW has kept these persons in the system nevertheless by arguing that the factual presence of NRAS makes them subject to the welfare agreement (Interview 21).…”