Civil society and the European common security and defence policy

Abstract

The involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) is widely regarded by students of the EU's domestic policy fields as enhancing transparency and accountability and, more generally, the democratic quality of political processes. This article explores the contribution of CSOs to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy and assesses whether a democracy-enhancing effect of their involvement can also be demonstrated for this policy field. We analyse the contribution of CSOs based on two common models of democracy: the intergovernmental and the supranational model of democracy. We find that CSOs are indeed quite actively involved in the EU's security policy. With regard to their democracy-enhancing effects, however, our findings are rather mixed. While the engagement of CSOs does provide a remedy for the democratic deficits associated with intergovernmental decision-making, these organizations do not fully meet the demands posed by supranational governance.

The power of informality: European Union’s engagement with non-state actors in Common Security and Defence Policy

“…However, the informality of the EU's engagement with NSA also implies that it remains hidden from the public eye. While expertise and information may flow between EU policymakers and NSA, there seems to be little interest on both sides in publicising these relations (see also Dembinski and Joachim 2014). It is noteworthy that NSA lobbying on CSDP in Brussels rarely mention the European Parliament as a target of their advocacy or an ally in opening up CSDP structures (which could also be due to the fact that the European Parliament's function of scrutinising CSDP is undeveloped).…”

“…Some scholars show that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are not missing actors in the EU security and defence policy. Lobbying the Council, national capitals and supranational institutions, they achieve some degree of success in reaching their policy goals (Joachim & Dembinski 2011;Dembinski & Joachim 2014). Other scholars demonstrate that NSA remain marginal in CSDP (Mérand et al 2011).…”

“…Moreover, cooperation with civil society is necessary in order to ensure broad local ownership of reforms, in which the EU tries to assist via CSDP, and more effective early warning and conflict prevention (Fihl 2015). Finally, the involvement of civil society in CSDP has a democratising potential: civil society organisations may improve the output legitimacy of EU decisions and enhance the transparency of the policy process (Dembinski & Joachim 2014). …”

Explaining variation in the implementation of global norms: Gender mainstreaming of security in the OSCE and the EU

“…It included more external actors, among them NGOs, and therefore was more akin to a ‘velvet triangle’ (Woodward, 2003), commonly seen as particularly important for gender equality change, than was the coalition in the OSCE. The broader coalition in the EU reflects the fact that the organization has started to formally institutionalize contacts with NGOs and civil society organizations in the field of security (Dembinski and Joachim, 2014). Accordingly, the reform coalition in the EU included not only the European Parliament and individual member states, such as France and Slovenia, but also UN agencies, such as UNIFEM, and civil society actors.…”

Situating the Gender Mainstreaming Norm in Regional Organisations: Comparing the Incorporation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in the EU and OSCE

“…Interested in how the institutional context affects the adoption of norms and the political struggles around their implementation, we chose these two organisations, because they differ regarding at least three institutional dimensions: (1) The scope of membership: the OSCE has more than double as many members as the EU, including not only Western and Eastern European states, but also North America, the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia. (2) The opportunity structures of both organisations differ with respect to the access of external actors to the policy-making process concerning security matters: whereas the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and EU Presidencies, as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS) have established close contacts with civil society organisations in the field of EU security (Dembinski and Joachim 2014), access for non-state actors to the OSCE Secretariat is still limited, particularly in the politicomilitary sphere (Tallberg et al 2013: 141-155). (3) The approaches of both organisations differ with respect to security policies: The EU's policies, once pillarised, are still compartmentalised with the Common Security and Defence Policy being a policy field separate from the common market or human rights especially with respect to the rules that apply to both.…”