Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining

Debs, Alexandre; Weiss, Jessica Chen

doi:10.1177/0022002714542874

Cited by 41 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…In addition to evaluating whether unfulfilled threats generate public opinion costs, we investigate four other rhetorical and propaganda strategies that the Chinese government has 16 De Sola Pool (1973b), p. 463. 17 Fearon (1994a); Smith (1998); Schultz (2012); Sartori (2002); Levy et al (2015); Guisinger and Smith (2002); Debs and Weiss (2016).…”

Section: Managing Public Reactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

Weiss

Dafoe

2019

International Studies Quarterly

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How do government rhetoric and propaganda affect mass reactions in international crises? Using two scenario-based survey experiments in China, one hypothetical and one that selectively reminds respondents of recent events, we assess how government statements and propaganda impact Chinese citizens’ approval of their government's performance in its territorial and maritime disputes. We find evidence that citizens disapprove more of inaction after explicit threats to use force, suggesting that leaders can face public opinion costs akin to audience costs in an authoritarian setting. However, we also find evidence that citizens approve of bluster—vague and ultimately empty threats—suggesting that talking tough can provide benefits, even in the absence of tough action. In addition, narratives that invoke future success to justify present restraint increase approval, along with frames that emphasize a shared history of injustice at the hands of foreign powers.

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Section: Managing Public Reactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

Weiss

Dafoe

2019

International Studies Quarterly

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“…BauerleDanzman, Winecoff, and Oatley 2017. 28. Among others, seePowell 1987;Morrow 1989;Fearon 1994;Schultz 1999;Weeks 2008;Trager and Vavreck 2011;Debs and Weiss 2014.…”

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confidence: 99%

COVID-19 and the Politics of Crisis

Lipscy¹

2020

Int Org

112

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The COVID-19 pandemic presents an opportunity to refocus scholarly attention on the politics of crisis. Crises that abruptly upend political and economic relations are important and increasing in frequency. However, the division of international relations into international political economy (IPE) and international security has contributed to the relative neglect of non-militarized crises like pandemics. Crises are defined by threat, uncertainty, and time pressure: understanding them requires a careful examination of how these variables affect political and economic outcomes. Drawing on often disparate literatures on finance, energy and climate change, natural disasters, pandemics, and violent conflict, I propose a broad research program around the politics of crisis, focusing on puzzles related to causes, responses, and transformations.

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“…The essential conclusion of the standard approach to private information centers on the idea that strong states fight in order to prove that they are not bluffing. However, states enjoy a variety of ways to prove that they are not bluffing, whether through audience costs (Fearon 1994), signals from domestic actors (Schultz 1998;Debs and Weiss 2014), the development of reputations (Guisinger and Smith 2002;Sartori 2002Sartori , 2005, various military moves (Fearon 1997;Slantchev 2005), or the sort of costless, credible mechanisms described at the beginning of this paper. States often go to war without appearing to engage in any of these.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Military Strategy, Private Information, and War

Lindsey

2015

Int Stud Q

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In conventional crisis bargaining models, bluffing provides the primary rationale for states to misrepresent their private information, and war occurs because strong states are unable to credibly demonstrate strength to their opponents. Here, I argue that military strategy supplies an alternative reason for states to misrepresent their private information. Both strong and weak states may misrepresent themselves because of the battlefield benefits of fighting against an uninformed opponent, who may choose a suboptimal military strategy. Under appropriate conditions, the military gains for concealing information exceed the diplomatic gains available for revealing that information. Thus, states will choose to keep secrets and fight. To demonstrate this, I incorporate military strategy into the standard bargaining framework, showing that military concerns incentivize both strong and weak states to conceal information, even when they are able to reveal that information costlessly and credibly. As in the usual model, war may occur when states underestimate their adversaries, but it may also occur when states overestimate their adversaries. I further show that a mere willingness to fight does not reveal that a state is strong. I conclude the paper with two brief case studies.

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Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining

Cited by 41 publications

References 45 publications

Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

COVID-19 and the Politics of Crisis

Military Strategy, Private Information, and War

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