Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath

Collins, Joseph

doi:10.21236/ada479658

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…42 42 See Klaus (2004:4–6). Similar calls for greater interagency planning in military policy execution have been echoed by Tyler Rauert at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Joseph Collins at the Institute for National Strategic Studies; see (Rauert 2008; Collins 2008). …”

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confidence: 79%

Architects of Empire: The Military-Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security

Morrissey

2011

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: This paper considers a key academic support of US geopolitics overseas, which I term the “military–strategic studies complex”. The paper begins by outlining the development of Strategic Studies in the US since the early 1980s. It then uses the example of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments to work through a discussion of the palpable agency of the military–strategic studies complex in advancing a dual military–economic securitization strategy for what it calls the contemporary American “leasehold empire”. This strategy is focused especially on the Persian Gulf and involves both an enduring US military presence and long‐term neoliberal designs for the region. Finally, consideration is given to alternative military–strategic visions before attention is turned to the task of Geography in countering US geopolitical and geoeconomic scriptings of the Middle East, all expedited under a vernacular of “national security”.

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confidence: 79%

Architects of Empire: The Military-Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security

Morrissey

2011

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“…This is the plan of operation 1003V, which is an evolution of the war plan of the first Gulf War. The official reasons were mainly the following [4,5]:…”

Section: Reasons Behind the Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

The 2003 Iraq War: Operations, Causes, and Consequences

Bassil¹

2012

IOSRJHSS

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“…This experience and the fact that he had expertise that pertained to foreign affairs is precisely why he was chosen to complement the young and inexperienced presidential candidate. Joseph Collins (2008) noted that Cheney's power was such that many issues leading to the invasion of Iraq were decided in private by the president and the vice president. Colin Powell made a similar observation, noting that things did not get decided until the president met with Cheney alone (Woodward 2004).…”

Section: Advocacy Coalition Strategies and Resources After 9/11mentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining George W. Bush's Adoption of the Neoconservative Agenda after 9/11

Haar

2010

Politics &Amp; Policy

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This article provides an explanation for the George W. Bush Administration's decision to use military force in Iraq. It first considers the neoconservative foreign policy advocacy coalition, finding that as the advocacy coalition framework suggests, neoconservatives functioned like other coalitions but with some interesting qualifications. The study then considers Bush's role in the decision‐making process, establishing that his motivations, combined with key components of his character, determined policy. The events of 9/11 aroused in the president a desire to cast himself in the mold of an American hero, one that would remake the Middle East and bring it into the fold of democratic states. It is the convergence of neoconservative belief and Bush's motivations that explain the decision. This article thus advances the discussion regarding the importance of individual characteristics in decision making and the possibility of joining two methods of inquiry that are often handled independently. Este artículo proporciona una explicación de la decisión de la administración de George W. Bush de utilizar fuerza militar en Irak. Primero considera la política exterior de una coalición de apoyo neoconservadora, encontrando que como el marco de la coalición de apoyo sugiere, los neoconservadores funcionan como otras coaliciones pero con algunas interesantes características. El estudio entonces considera el rol de Bush en el proceso de toma de decisión, estableciendo que sus motivaciones combinadas con componentes claves de su carácter, determinaron la política. Los eventos del 11/9 despertaron en el presidente un deseo de asumir el papel del héroe americano, uno que reconfiguraría el Medio Oriente y lo democratizaría. La convergencia de la creencia neoconservadora y las motivaciones de Bush explican la decisión. Este artículo entonces avanza la discusión con relación a la importancia de las características individuales en la toma de decisiones y la posibilidad de unir dos métodos de investigación que son a menudo manejados independientemente.

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Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath

Cited by 4 publications

References 3 publications

Architects of Empire: The Military-Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security

Architects of Empire: The Military-Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security

The 2003 Iraq War: Operations, Causes, and Consequences

Explaining George W. Bush's Adoption of the Neoconservative Agenda after 9/11

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