Voting behavior in international organizations, most notably in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), is often used to infer the similarity of foreign policy preferences of member states. Most of these measures ignore, however, that particular co-voting patterns may appear simply by chance (Häge 2011) and that these patterns of agreement (or the absence thereof) are only observable if decisions are reached through roll-call votes. As the relative frequency of roll-call votes changes considerably over time in most international organizations, currently used similarity and affinity measures offer a misleading picture. Based on a complete data set of UNGA resolution decisions, we demonstrate how taking different forms of chance agreement and the relative prevalence of consensus decisions into account affects conclusions about the effect of the similarity of member states' foreign policy positions on foreign aid allocation.Affinity measures based on voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) have become increasingly popular. Since Gartzke's (1998) prominent use of such data, almost 100 articles and papers have relied on voting data in order to construct preference measures for states and their governments (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten forthcoming). These affinity measures are all predicated on the idea that observing a pair of countries voting frequently in unison is the result of preference affinities (see, for instance, Alesina and Dollar 2000).In the context of voting in the UNGA, however, such measures are problematic for at least three reasons: First, these measures do not take into account the possibility of chance 2 agreement (Häge 2011). Affinity measures indicate high agreement scores simply as a result of a high propensity of both dyad members to cast a vote of the same type, even if these propensities have little to do with the policy substance of the individual decisions voted upon.As a remedy, Häge (2011) proposes to use indices that report agreement over and beyond the agreement expected based on certain assumptions about the marginal vote distribution of dyad members.Second, Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (forthcoming) convincingly show that currently used affinity measures cannot address the issue of changing agendas. More specifically, if due to a particular conflict, a series of resolutions are voted upon in one year but not in the other, the preference configuration related to this conflict will strongly affect affinity measures even though the underlying preference similarity of states has not changed.According to these authors, a one-dimensional item-response theory (IRT) model with bridging observations across sessions formed by resolutions with very similar contents allows to circumvent this problem.A third issue, however, has so far remained largely unaddressed: the fact that consensus voting plays an important role in many international organizations in general and the UNGA in particular. In the UNGA, for instance, only a small share of resolutions are actually voted upon, whil...