Choice Logic Programs and Nash Equilibria in Strategic Games

Vos, Marina De; Vermeir, Dirk

doi:10.1007/3-540-48168-0_19

Cited by 24 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…For instance, it has been observed in [22,23] that stable models for choice logic programs (i.e., the formalism at the basis of the LAIMAS/JOF platform [21]) can exactly be defined as the Nash equilibria of a suitable associated game. A similar characterization for the CP nets formalism appeared in [2].…”

Section: Distributed Rational Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Solving abduction by computing joint explanations

Greco

2007

Ann Math Artif Intell

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An extension of abduction is investigated where explanations are jointly computed by sets of interacting agents. On the one hand, agents are allowed to partially contribute to the reasoning task, so that joint explanations can be singled out even if each agent does not have enough knowledge for carrying out abduction on its own. On the other hand, agents maintain their autonomy in choosing explanations, each one being equipped with a weighting function reflecting its perception about the reliability of sets of hypotheses. Given that different agents may have different and possibly contrasting preferences on the hypotheses to be chosen, some reasonable notions of agents' agreement are introduced, and their computational properties are thoroughly studied. As an example application of the framework discussed in the paper, it is shown how to handle data management issues in Peer-to-Peer systems and, specifically, how to provide a repair-based semantics to inconsistent ones.

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Section: Distributed Rational Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Solving abduction by computing joint explanations

Greco

2007

Ann Math Artif Intell

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“…In [13], a strategic game is represented using a choice logic program, where a set of rules expresses that a player will select a "best response" given the other players' choices. Then, for every strategic game, there exists a choice logic program such that the set of stable models of the program coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the game.…”

Section: Expressing Static Games In Propositional Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compact preference representation and Boolean games

Bonzon

Lagasquie-Schiex

Lang

et al. 2008

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games (Harrenstein, Logic in conflict, PhD thesis, 2004; Harrenstein et al., Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, pp. 287-298, San Francisco, Morgan Kaufmann, 2001) yield a compact representation of 2-player zero-sum static games with binary preferences: an agent's strategy consists of a truth assignment of the propositional variables she controls, and a player's preferences are expressed by a plain propositional formula. These restrictions (2-player, zero-sum, binary preferences) strongly limit the expressivity of the framework. We first generalize the framework to n-player games which are not necessarily zero-sum. We give simple characterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the computational complexity of the associated problems. Then, we relax the last restriction by coupling Boolean games with a representation, namely, CP-nets.

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“…First of all we need a mechanism to represent the possible decisions. As argued in [4,5], choice logic programs are an intuitive tool to represent conditional decisions, as the semantics make sure that only one alternative is chosen. Thus, choice logic programs will be the fundaments on which we build our new formalism.…”

Section: Example 1 (Tommy's Birthday)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The basis of Ordered Choice Logic Programs are, as the name already might have indicated, choice logic programs [4,5]. We identify these choice logic program with their grounded version, i.e.…”

Section: Ordered Choice Logic Programsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Logic for Modeling Decision Making with Dynamic Preferences

Vos¹,

Vermeir²

2000

Logics in Artificial Intelligence

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Abstract. We present a framework for decision making with the possibility to express circumstance-dependent preferences among different alternatives for a decision. This new formalism, Ordered Choice Logic Programs (OCLP), builds upon choice logic programs to define a preference/specialization relation on sets of choice rules. We show that our paradigm is an intuitive extension of both ordered logic and choice logic programming such that decisions can comprise more than two alternatives which become only available when a choice is actually forced. The semantics for OCL programs is based on stable models for which we supply a characterization in terms of assumption sets and a fixpoint algorithm. Furthermore we demonstrate that OCLPs allow an elegant translation of finite extensive games with perfect information such that the stable models of the program correspond, depending on the transformation, to either the Nash equilibria or the subgame perfect equilibria of the game.

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Choice Logic Programs and Nash Equilibria in Strategic Games

Cited by 24 publications

References 8 publications

Solving abduction by computing joint explanations

Solving abduction by computing joint explanations

Compact preference representation and Boolean games

A Logic for Modeling Decision Making with Dynamic Preferences

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