Choice Architecture in Shakespeare’s Public Meetings: Nudge Theory and Richard III, Coriolanus, and Julius Caesar

Abstract

The political and dramatic intentions behind the use of appeals to the early modern public (on and off stage) have already been examined by Shakespeareans. This article points out the technical workings of such appeals by using two new areas of research on decision-making: the ethnography of public meetings and behavioural economics on how to influence choosers. These theories can illuminate the strategies used by the tribunes in handling the citizens of Coriolanus, by Antony in dealing with the plebeians in Julius Caesar, and by Buckingham and Richard when gathering support from the Londoners in Richard III. Using six common psychological biases (anchor-and-adjust, availability, representativeness, priming, arousal, and group norms), Shakespeare’s politicians prompt their hearers to change their minds: a celebrity warrior is recast as a wily tyrant, an execution as a murder, and a regent as the legitimate king.