Chinese Political Nostalgia and Xi Jinping's Dream of Great Rejuvenation

Abstract

China's emergence as a great power has been accompanied by the official rhetoric of the China Dream of Great Rejuvenation (weida fuxing 伟大复兴). Although there are conflicting views among academics and political elites about the exact content of the China Dream, one of its features is the nostalgia for China's past and its five-thousand-year-old civilization. Xi Jinping's current rhetoric of a China Dream of Great Rejuvenation uses a reinvented history as an asset for the future, linking China's natural progress as a global power with a selective re-reading of its millennial history. While much existing literature already discusses China's Great Rejuvenation, this article looks more specifically at the role of historical memory and deconstructs the key interconnected components that support Xi's rhetoric, namely, the chosen trauma, glory, and amnesia. The conclusion offers some general remarks about the effect of this rhetoric on China's domestic and foreign policy and some of the risks that accompany it. This article contributes to the debates on the influence of memory in International Relations (IR), showing how constructed memories of history can significantly impact both national identity and foreign policy.

China’s State-Party Nationalism: seeking wealth and power under China’s Dream of Great Rejuvenation | O Nacionalismo do Estado-partido da China: a procura por riqueza e poder no contexto do Sonho Chinês de Grande Rejuvenescimento

“…The CCP's severe crackdown was followed by the Patriotic Education Campaign in 1991, which modernized the curriculum in schools and boosted Party propaganda to foster state-led, patriotic nationalism. Starting timidly in the 1980s and with great impetus in the 1990s, the CCP promoted the study of Chinese history and Confucianism to "re-sinisize" China (Carrai, 2021). These campaigns were followed by manifestations of popular nationalism (Gries, 2004), especially in cases such as the 2001 imbroglio with the US over the spy-plane crash in the South China Sea and the 2005 widespread anti-Japanese protests in China (Wasserstrom, 2005).…”

“…In virtually all of his official statements, Xi Jinping refers to ancient philosophers, ideas, and values (Vasconcelos, 2017). Trauma, encapsulated in the century of humiliation, still wields considerable importance, but the historical sources now also lie in glory and amnesia (Carrai, 2021).…”

“…In China, historical memories are selectively used to serve the CCP's political and strategic objectives, shaping nationalist discourse according to their interests (Zhao, 2015;Carrai, 2021). According to Hussaini (2021), since Xi Jinping's ascension to power, nationalism is a mix of pride about China's rapid economic development, the bemoaning of the century of humiliation, a backlash to foreign "provocative" acts, and the CCP's deliberate promotion of nationalist sentiments -from educational campaigns about China's unique civilization to its territorial needs.…”

“…According to Hussaini (2021), since Xi Jinping's ascension to power, nationalism is a mix of pride about China's rapid economic development, the bemoaning of the century of humiliation, a backlash to foreign "provocative" acts, and the CCP's deliberate promotion of nationalist sentiments -from educational campaigns about China's unique civilization to its territorial needs. These sources of nationalism are worked out within frameworks that selectively rescue past glories and traumas (Carrai, 2021). Hence, Xi Jinping sees the century of humiliation as the antithesis of China's Dream of Great Rejuvenation and, as such, should be avoided at all costs.…”

“…But to operationalize this dichotomy between trauma and glory and cements its legitimacy, the CCP also needs to promote amnesia (Carrai, 2021), "forgetting" Chinese expansionism under the Qianglong Emperor in the eighteenth century, the many instances that China was splintered Against this backdrop, with trauma, glory, and amnesia, China is producing what I call "state-party nationalism." According to a Peking University professor 3 , in the aftermath of the 2018 constitutional reforms, China began to transit from a "one-party state" towards an enormous party that is confounded with the nation itself -therefore the name "state-party."…”