Chinese-Iranian Mutual Strategic Perceptions

Abstract

This article analyzes Sino-Iranian relations and mutual strategic perceptions, highlighting several types of tension in Sino-Iranian ties alongside areas of deeper cooperation. We examine in particular the policy debates about China between conservatives and reformists within Iran, and we compare their views of China to the views of Iran held by Chinese commentators. To that end, we extensively survey both the official media and scholarly literature in Farsi and in Chinese, since each strand reveals different sentiments and is accorded a different degree of openness.

The Dynamics of Sino‐Iranian Relations: Strategic Veneer, Intrinsic Tensions and Third‐party Leverage

“…Although not explicitly mentioned when the BRI’s blueprint was first announced, its significance to the Asia Economic Corridor was apparent as Iran was grouped, along with Pakistan, in China's East Asia ‘home affairs’ region rather than as part of the West Asia zone or the Middle East. Its geostrategic value to Beijing can also be seen in the writings of Chinese scholars (Ehteshami et al, 2018, pp. 15–24).…”

“…Commerce, energy, and military collaboration are the three pillars around which Sino‐Iranian relations revolve (MacGillivray, 2019, p. 15). Beijing and Tehran have identified trade as the most important of the three (Ehteshami et al, 2018, p. 16). Yet, every time the Chinese have dipped their toes into the Iranian market, they have encountered the same issues that have discouraged Iran’s other prospective trading partners.…”

“…Negative attitudes towards the quality of Chinese products and technology, failures in delivery, and the repercussions of China's dominance for Iranian industry and labour have created a backlash (Bazoobandi, 2015, pp. 268–270; Ehteshami et al, 2018, pp. 5–8).…”

“…Iranian merchants and businesses are openly frustrated by China's monopolies in key sectors and are resentful of the perceived leverage exercised by Chinese businesses. Iranian consumers, too, consider Chinese products ‘inferior’ when compared with goods from Europe, Japan, and South Korea or even their Iranian equivalents (Bazoobandi, 2015, p. 270; Calabrese, 2019; Ehteshami et al, 2018, p. 7). Chinese support for the clerical regime may also be contributing to anti‐Chinese sentiments among Iranian opposition groups and protestors (Teer & Wang, 2018, p. 170).…”

The China Model and Its Detractors in Iran

“…Interestingly, as Ehteshami has documented, Iranian hardliners have been very sensitive to criticism of China over its treatment of its Muslim population. 85 increased from $280 billion in 1995 to $4.6 trillion in 2018, or 12.4 percent of global trade, and it is the largest trading partner of more than 124 countries. 88 It is understandable that countries around the globe (especially developing nations) seek to learn the secrets of China's achievements.…”