2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2037177
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China's Secondary Privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform

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Cited by 64 publications
(100 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
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“…Prior to the NTS reform, on average state agencies controlled 71.78% of the sample firms for the time period 1999 to 2004, but the average decreased to 61.45% in the later period (from 2005 to 2008), after the implementation of the NTS reform. Consistent with this, Liao et al (2014) also report that state ownership in Chinese SOEs has gradually decreased since the reform.…”
Section: Data Descriptionsupporting
confidence: 58%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Prior to the NTS reform, on average state agencies controlled 71.78% of the sample firms for the time period 1999 to 2004, but the average decreased to 61.45% in the later period (from 2005 to 2008), after the implementation of the NTS reform. Consistent with this, Liao et al (2014) also report that state ownership in Chinese SOEs has gradually decreased since the reform.…”
Section: Data Descriptionsupporting
confidence: 58%
“…The NTS reform is an effort to further encourage the privatization process in China (Liao et al, 2014), with a gradual relinquishing of ownership control by government agencies. Firm behavior is expected to be more market-orientated post the NTS reform due to the elimination of non-tradable shares.…”
Section: The Nts Reform and Risk-takingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In columns 3 and 4, we split the sample into two subsamples based on whether the level of relatedparty transactions associated with the controlling shareholder (RPT) is higher or lower (including being equal to) than the median. RPT is defined as the ratio of firms' related-party transactions associated with controlling shareholders to total assets at the previous fiscal year-end (Liao, Liu, and Wang (2014)). In columns 5 and 6, we split the sample into two subsamples based on whether the level of intercorporate loans (ORECTA) to the controlling shareholder is higher or lower (including being equal to) than the median.…”
Section: Agency Costmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is an increasing interest in the academic literature to explore this topic. For instance, Liao et al (2014) provide evidence of increased output, profits, and employment among SOEs following the reform, especially if there are greater incentives of increasing state-owned share value. Chen et al (2012) find evidence consistent with less free cash flow problem among firms after the reform, and the effect is more pronounced for those with weaker governance.…”
Section: Institutional Settingsmentioning
confidence: 99%