China’s offensive in Southeast Asia: regional architecture and the process of Sinicization

Abstract

During the 1990s, China had aimed at constructing good relations with neighboring countries including ASEAN members. After the start of external offensive strategy in 2001, China began to accelerate its economic involvement in Asian countries in general, and ASEAN countries in particular. At the same time, China has attempted to create China-led institutional framework and to make the region suitable to Chinese existence. This activity is called "the process of Sinicization" in this article. To explore the process of Sinicization in reference to China's relations with CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) and Thailand, or China's relations with ASEAN members, the author examines in detail two cases of the Greater Mekong Subregion Scheme or GMS (since 1992) and the Nanning-based China-ASEAN EXPO or CAEXPO (since 2004) in addition to comparison of Chinese and Japanese economic involvement in Southeast Asia. Through these case studies, the author will clarify the fact that both GMS and CAEXPO become strategic institutions/organizations for not only the promotion of regional cooperation but also the creation of China-led initiatives, such as various China-ASEAN forums. Furthermore, GMS and CAEXPO have also served as instruments to support economic development of border areas in China. Finally, by reviewing the recent movement of the "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) strategy and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or AIIB, the author posits that Chinese external offensive will be modified in the process of the OBOR and AIIB's adjustment to international circumstances.

Comprehending Brunei Darussalam’s vanishing claims in the South China Sea: China’s exertion of economic power and the influence of elite perception

“…The current stance taken by Brunei from 2010 until the present time represents a dynamic of 'foreign policy anomaly. Other claimant states to the South China Sea have consistently shown and expressed their tough stance and unwillingness to give up the significant maritime boundaries to one of the most emerging economies in the world (He, 2019;Sato, 2013;Suehiro, 2017). However, Brunei has decided to consider other alternatives in responding to China's aggression in the South China Sea, by neglecting the act of belligerence, and focusing on the possible opportunities that can preside if a soft stance is implemented in the case of the South China Sea.…”

Beyond the hinterland: exploring the international actorness of China’s Yunnan province

“…In the following years, China adopted a more active approach in vying for the support of the Mekong countries. It came up with the Asian Debt Relief scheme, to write off old debts and provide new foreign aid to these countries (Suehiro 2017). Over the same period, China redoubled its contribution to projects under the GMS.…”

“…China accounted for only 27 per cent of the total investment value, with 35 per cent coming from ADB; however, China would later overtake ADB as the primary investor and is now responsible for more than 60 per cent of the GMS investment in 2016 (Suehiro 2017).…”

China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment in the Greater Mekong Subregion

“…international financial institutions other than the ADB, and (4) non-regional countries' foreign aid agencies participating in joint projects (Suehiro, 2017). Major investors in GMS projects are the ADB, the Chinese government, and non-regional countries co-financing joint projects (including the JICA, the JBIC, the China Development Bank, as well as French, Swedish, and Dutch foreign aid agencies).…”

“…In addition, China's incentive is due to the path of economic spillover effects that will ultimately lead to regional stability and prosperity. This indicates that the GMS might not appear to be an "international governmental cooperation" (Suehiro 2017).…”