China’s long game in techno-nationalism

Abstract

The passage of China’s national cybersecurity law in June 2017 has been interpreted as an unprecedented impediment to the operation of foreign firms in the country, with its new requirements for data localization, network operators’ cooperation with law enforcement officials, and online content restrictions, among others. Although the law’s scope is indeed broader than that of any previous regulation, the process through which it was drafted and eventually approved bears similarities to three previous cases from the past two decades of Chinese information technology policy-making. In comparing these four cases, we argue that economic concerns have consistently overshadowed claims of national security considerations throughout laws directed at foreign enterprises.

The strange case ofUSv.ZTE: a prosecution, a ban, a fine and a presidential intervention

“…Among the complaints of non-Chinese firms have been alleged attempts to force the disclosure of their intellectual property, both as part of joint-ventures and to assure Chinese authorities against possible insecurities of hardware and software (Ahmed and Weber, 2018;Malkin, 2018). It is alleged that the real aim has been to advance the Chinese ICT sector.…”

“…Sabre-rattling by the Trump Administration and the subsequent trade war are about industry policy, seeking to shore up domestic technology businesses and economic advantages (Huang, 2018a), as China endeavours to break out of the middle-income "trap" by increasing spending on research and development (Veugelers, 2017;Ahmed and Weber, 2018) [11]. In particular, it is a response to the Made in China 2025 initiative of the Chinese government and the related industrial plans [12], with "unfair" subsidies that allegedly violate WTO agreements.…”