1995
DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/11.4.25
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China's Credit Plan: An Overview

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Cited by 14 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…The structural break dates for growth are in line with the country's gradual approach to privatisation (1988, 1990) and the restructuring of state‐owned enterprises exercise (1992). The structural break for financial depth in 1992–93 coincides with the government's adoption of a 16‐point programme credit plan which imposes individual credit ceilings on specialised banks (Montes‐Negret, ). The structural break date in 2005 could be linked to the start of the property bubble in both commercial and real estate in the country.…”
Section: Methodology and Empirical Findingsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The structural break dates for growth are in line with the country's gradual approach to privatisation (1988, 1990) and the restructuring of state‐owned enterprises exercise (1992). The structural break for financial depth in 1992–93 coincides with the government's adoption of a 16‐point programme credit plan which imposes individual credit ceilings on specialised banks (Montes‐Negret, ). The structural break date in 2005 could be linked to the start of the property bubble in both commercial and real estate in the country.…”
Section: Methodology and Empirical Findingsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The PBC set the quantitative bank-specific loan quotas, which were precise lending ceilings for individual financial institutions, and provided liquidity to those banks, which then allocated credit to governmentpreferred subsectors and projects (see Montes-Negret 1995). Banks adjusted their lending activities to meet the loan quotas.…”
Section: Institutional Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, this direct control over the lending quantity of individual banks led to a mismatch between credit supply and demand, hindering the efficient allocation of credits. Furthermore, with the new development of financing sources other than bank credits, the relationship between the credit plan and real GDP became less predictable (see Montes-Negret 1995 Dickinson and Liu (2007) present an in-depth discussion on how monetary policy affects the real economy in China during this transition period. 8 According to the PBC, monetary aggregates are M0 (currency in circulation), M1 (sum of M0 plus demand deposits) and M2 (the sum of M1 plus savings and time deposits) (see PBC 's Annual Report 2007).…”
Section: Institutional Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As the only low-risk vehicle available for savings in the economy, it offers an extremely low real rate of return on bank deposits. In addition, about 80% of the bank loans were extended to the state sector in the early 1990's (Montes-Negret, 1995). By charging interest rates well below market clearing levels on the bank loans, the banking system actually subsidizes government investment projects and the loss-incurring state-owned enterprises.…”
Section: Credit Control and Interest Rate Regulationmentioning
confidence: 99%