China's Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada

Separatism and Regionalism in Modern Europe

“…The foothold southern states (like China) could gain in the Artic through Greenland has Arctic states and circumpolar Indigenous peoples concerned. Given that Arctic governance is largely normative, the influence of China could tip the scales toward greater incentives for non-cooperation or serve as an argument toward greater binding and treaty-based law in the Far North (Lackenbauer et al, 2018). This would have serious negative implications for the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic who benefit from a normative, soft-law system of governance.…”

“…Such a comprehensive and diplomatic offensive challenges Western dominance in developing regions and is motivated by a desire to acquire vital resources and new markets to fuel its own economy. Work on China's investment foothold in Africa and Central Asia is extensive, the latest wave of which can be traced back to the burgeoning 21st century (Alden, 2005;Sheives, 2006); however, scholarship on China's interest and strategy in the Arctic has only taken off in the 2010s and relies a great deal more on conjecture from Chinese communications and promises, and a keen (if imperfect) ability to distinguish between expressed justifications and hidden motivations (Ingimundarson, 2014;Lackenbauer, 2014;Lackenbauer, Lajeunesse, Manicom, & Lasserre, 2018). Among the Greenlandic parties, different levels of willingness to partner with non-Arctic states are espoused.…”

China’s Economic Presence in the Arctic: Realities, Expectations and Concerns

“…While such processes may seem less likely to occur in rich, developed and relatively well-governed Arctic states, various actors express concerns (e.g., Lackenbauer et al, 2018;Lasserre et al, 2017;Department of State, 2019). Rosen and Thuringen (2017) claim that Chinese investments could indeed constitute a security risk, particularly in smaller Arctic jurisdictions:…”

Societal Impacts of a Rapidly Changing Arctic

“…Other analyses examine more specifically the role and interests of China [131][132][133][134][135][136][137], the European Union [134,136,[138][139][140][141][142][143][144][145][146][147][148][149], and the UK [150][151][152][153][154][155] in terms of their strategic and political interest in Arctic commodities, how they affect the environmental, economic, political, and legal developments in the North, and their historical linkage to and justification for a role in Arctic affairs. The implications of these 'new' or 'non-Arctic' players for specific Arctic states, like Canada [156] and Russia [157,158], have also received attention. Non-Arctic states also appear in different membership categories in Arctic governance bodies; especially the enlarged group of observers to the Arctic Council has been scrutinised as to the institutional and procedural consequences for the Council [159][160][161][162].…”