2020
DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2021.1905543
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China as an Offshore Balancer in the Middle East and North Africa

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Bin Huwaidin (2022) observes that ‘China wants to use its relationship with Iran to give itself leverage against the United States on important issues such as’ … resisting US domination of the international system’. And more generally, Ghiselli and Giuffrida (2020: 10) claim that Beijing's current strategy in the Middle East ‘is aimed at contributing to the transformation of the regional order from unipolar, that is to say controlled by the US, to multipolar’.…”
Section: Current Prc Activism In the Persian Gulfmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bin Huwaidin (2022) observes that ‘China wants to use its relationship with Iran to give itself leverage against the United States on important issues such as’ … resisting US domination of the international system’. And more generally, Ghiselli and Giuffrida (2020: 10) claim that Beijing's current strategy in the Middle East ‘is aimed at contributing to the transformation of the regional order from unipolar, that is to say controlled by the US, to multipolar’.…”
Section: Current Prc Activism In the Persian Gulfmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By February 2020, the Chinese delegation used its veto right at the UNSC eight times together with Russia to block Western resolutions aimed at adopting measures against the Assad regime, including censures, use of sanctions, and International Criminal Court referral (Calabrese, 2019; Foot, 2006). However, China has also sought to preserve a certain distance from Russia, which has utilized a meaningful amount of economic and military resources to support the Syrian government (Ghiselli & Giuffrida, 2020, p. 17). The Chinese government did not want to become an official member of the diplomatic initiatives led by Russia despite participating in several meetings in Astana and Sochi (Ghiselli & Giuffrida, 2020, p. 17).…”
Section: China and The Syrian Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, China has also sought to preserve a certain distance from Russia, which has utilized a meaningful amount of economic and military resources to support the Syrian government (Ghiselli & Giuffrida, 2020, p. 17). The Chinese government did not want to become an official member of the diplomatic initiatives led by Russia despite participating in several meetings in Astana and Sochi (Ghiselli & Giuffrida, 2020, p. 17).…”
Section: China and The Syrian Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The main category of research addresses the question of whether China's expansion is driven primarily by the need for new markets as part of new domestic economic and energy security‐related imperatives or by its desire to extend its global influence in a geopolitical competition between great powers in the context of its Belt and Road Initiative. (Ghiselli & Giuffrida, 2020; Niblock, 2022; Zhang & Xiao, 2022) A second stream of scholarship has assessed changes in the nature of China's bilateral ties with a particular state in the Middle East in light of China's growing global power and influence. (Atli, 2018; Conduit & Akbarzadeh, 2019; Fulton, 2018).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%