China as a Polar Great Power

Brady, Anne‐Marie

doi:10.1017/9781316832004

Cited by 102 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Other commentators suggest that the Chinese desire to not limit krill fishing potential in the East Antarctic should also be considered a part of geopolitical power projection (Liu, 2019b). It would not be the first time that China has taken the opportunity to position itself in this way as a polar power (Brady, 2017).…”

Section: Proposal For the Establishment Of Mpas In East Antarcticamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several Consultative Parties were again concerned about allowing the creation of an ASMA in an area where activities are carried out by only one Party. Brady (2017) suggested that it may also be interpreted as granting China a certain status of "soft-sovereignty" or "soft-presence" over territory within Antarctica (Brady, 2017). This concept of "soft sovereignty" relies on the idea that ASMAs and ASPAs can be used by claimant States as means to consolidate their occupation of Antarctica, and for potential claimant states to lay the groundwork for future territorial claims (Brady, 2017).…”

Section: Proposal For the Establishment Of Mpas In East Antarcticamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Antarctica is clearly not as central to China's national interests as, say, international trade or maritime issues in areas such as the South China Sea. However, it has been suggested that China views the polar regions, including the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean, as important areas for future resource extraction (Brady, 2017). Liu (2020a) argues that rising Chinese economic and political power is driving a desire of Chinese policymakers to reshape international law and institutions to be more aligned with Chinese interests.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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“Logrolling” in Antarctic governance: Limits and opportunities

2020

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The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is considered a successful example of international governance as it has managed tensions over sovereignty claims, avoided militarisation and dealt with marine resources and environmental protection. Recently, China’s influence and assertiveness in many international institutions have significantly grown. What effect this shift in the international politics will have upon Antarctic governance remains to be seen. However, to further thinking on this issue we explore two current case studies that reveal pressure points within the ATS. First, in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Australia has proposed marine protected areas off East Antarctica, to which China and several other states have objected. Second, in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings, China has proposed special management arrangements for the area around the “Kunlun” station, to which Australia and several other states have objected. Negotiation theory suggests “logrolling” (i.e. trade of mutual decision-making support across issue areas) can be an effective strategy to avoid diplomatic deadlocks. We therefore consider the merits of a logrolling strategy for the above issues. We find that while a logrolling strategy in the ATS might facilitate short-term diplomatic success, it would carry significant risks, including the weakening of existing norms.

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Section: Proposal For the Establishment Of Mpas In East Antarcticamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Proposal For the Establishment Of Mpas In East Antarcticamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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“Logrolling” in Antarctic governance: Limits and opportunities

2020

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“…The fourth Blue Economic Passage from China via the Arctic Sea to Europe was made explicit within the context of the Maritime Sea Road when the State Council Information Office (SCIO ) published China's Arctic Policy . Styling itself as a ‘near Arctic‐nation’, China's policy seeks to take advantage of the greater seasonal accessibility of the passage, following the receding of the ice sheet due to climate change, and consummate the country's bid to join the ranks of the great polar powers (Brady ). This situation provides China with an opportunity to use the country's shipping on the trans‐Arctic routes to service the country's economic investments from oil and gas to tourism within the contested ‘High North’ region.…”

Section: The Sea Roadmentioning

confidence: 99%

China's Belt and Road Initiative: underlying economic and international relations dimensions

Rimmer

2018

Asian-Pac Economic Lit

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In reviewing the literature on the Belt and Road Initiative, attention is paid to the antecedents of China's Silk Road revival, the domestic driving forces, and the perennial search for energy security behind the policy initiated in 2013. After detailing and interpreting the Initiative's timeline, key aspects of the government's policy are analysed; its financial arrangements are noted; and the initial 64 countries covered by the Belt and Road identified. The signature Land Belt and the Sea Road components are analysed using an array of tools: economic corridors, blue economic passages, and economic circles. Reference is made to specific projects and the varied reactions stemming from other countries to the implications of China's policy implementation. Finally, an assessment of the Initiative's first five years is made before looking ahead to consider how it may dovetail with other government programs as Beijing addresses the next 45 years of its planned life.

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“…Suspicions about China's Arctic presence results, to begin with, from the dynamics of a global power shift. For instance, when five Chinese Navy ships were cruising off the coast of Alaska in September 2015, observers concluded that China was extending its naval reach into the Arctic (Brady, 2017). The fact that China identifies itself as 'near Arctic state' and 'stakeholder' also raises suspicions (Jakobson and Peng, 2012).…”

Section: From Uncertainty and Suspicion To Accepting China In The Arcticmentioning

confidence: 99%

Science Diplomacy and Trust Building: ‘Science China’ in the Arctic

Mayer

2018

Global Policy

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Science diplomacy creates possibilities for trust building in international relations. We draw on studies of science, diplomacy, and trust in IR and explore Chinese scientific activities in the Arctic in order to sketch out four mechanisms that produce procedural and generalized forms of trust: the sharing of resources and infrastructure, personal interactions, science‐based institutions, and spillover effects. The materials of the case of ‘science China’ also help to question assumptions about science diplomacy in IR as they illustrate its inherent tensions, boundaries, and limitations.

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China as a Polar Great Power

Cited by 102 publications

References 49 publications

“Logrolling” in Antarctic governance: Limits and opportunities

“Logrolling” in Antarctic governance: Limits and opportunities

China's Belt and Road Initiative: underlying economic and international relations dimensions

Science Diplomacy and Trust Building: ‘Science China’ in the Arctic

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