China and the Worldwide Search for Oil Security

Jakobson, Linda; Zha, Daojiong

doi:10.1080/13439000601062601

Cited by 17 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Efforts were made to expand economic ties, and Khartoum hosted a Chinese trade fair in 1993. The Government of Sudan (GOS) expressed interest in Chinese involvement in developing Sudan's oil sector in 1994 (after Chevron, which had discovered oil in 1978, sold its concessions at a loss in 1992), and CNPC conducted a preliminary survey (see Jakobson and Zha, 2006). In September 1995 China's 'energy cooperation' with Sudan gathered momentum when President Bashir visited Beijing and secured a reduced rate loan, with an agreement between the China Exim Bank and the Bank of Sudan to finance oil development following in December.…”

Section: The Nif's Turn To Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

China & the Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan

Large¹

2008

Review of African Political Economy

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The core Chinese foreign policy principle of non-interference has recently come under increasing and more visible strain in China's relations with Sudan. Noninterference has been central to Beijing's relations with different governments in Khartoum since 1959. From the mid-1990s, however, the Chinese role in Sudan has become more embedded and consequential. Today China faces the challenge of accommodating its established policy of non-interference with the more substantive and growing complexity of Chinese involvement developed over the past decade in Sudan, amidst ongoing conflict in western Darfur and changing politics after the North-South peace agreement of January 2005.

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Section: The Nif's Turn To Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

China & the Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan

Large¹

2008

Review of African Political Economy

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“…China, on the other hand, is more willing than Western IOCs to establish an entire chain of an oil industry, including local refinery facilities, petrochemical industries, as well as other infrastructure that is not directly related to oil exploration, such as roads, bridges, and dams, etc. Oil nations are, consequently, willing to offer oil deals to China in exchange for such infrastructure build-ups (Jakobson and Zha, 2006 (3) where it ODI is comprised of only positive ODI observations. Except for the inverse Mills ratio, it Mills , all other explanatory variables are the same as in specification (2).…”

Section: 22mentioning

confidence: 99%

China’s Outward Direct Investment and Its Oil Quest

Qian

2012

The Evolving Role of China in the Global Economy

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We investigate the empirical determinants of China's outward direct investment (ODI) in conventional oil producing countries. Using China's approved ODI data and a new ODI data set in the OECD-IMF standard, we find that China's ODI seeks foreign markets and is averse to political risks. Interestingly, corruption attracts investments from China. We also find that China's reliance on imported oil pushes and the "going global" policy promotes China's ODI to quest for more foreign oil. A host country's energy output does not affect its probability of receiving China's investment. However, after China decides to invest, it tends to invest more in oil countries with a relatively high level of energy output. Subject to the different investment strategies that China implements, the behavior of China's ODI in the Middle East, Africa, and other oil producing countries is different. While China's ODI has put more weight on Africa and other oil nations, it has reduced its degree of reliance on the Middle East area. Nevertheless, the Middle East remains China's main source of imported oil.

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“…These feats carry huge prestige inside the Party and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC): "[of all] Chinese investment overseas, CNPC's Sudan operation represents the single most outstanding success". 57 Sudan has been a formative experience in altering Beijing's approach to Africa and how it thinks about intervening in what it previously considered as strictly internal affairs: it is where China has begun to abandon its sacrosanct principle of non-interference. 58 Darfur constituted a key part of the steep learning curve regarding foreign policy, commercial diplomacy and intervention more broadly that China has followed over the last 20 years.…”

Section: Beyond Darfur: Momentum For More Intervention Not Lessmentioning

confidence: 99%