China and the Accountability Politics of Hydropower Development: How Effective are Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Mekong Region?

Yeophantong, Pichamon

doi:10.1355/cs42-1d

Cited by 29 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…These findings, we should note, stand in slight contrast to Yeophantong’s (2013), who reveals how nascent TANs in the Mekong region have managed to alter the course of some Chinese hydropower projects. As controversy swirled around the consequences of the Chinese-financed Myitsone hydropower dam in Myanmar, for instance, a network of civil society groups in Myanmar (e.g., Eco Dev) and regional NGOs (e.g., Salween Watch based in Chiang Mai, Thailand) began calling for the termination of the project.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 56%

“…The following year, the Chinese NGO Global Environmental Institute helped organize a meeting between a vice-minister of the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection and Myanmar’s Eco Dev NGO to discuss the issues surrounding the Myitsone dam. This example illustrates that China–South TANs can form and wield some influence (Yeophantong, 2013). Noting the absence of a China–Ecuador TAN versus a very early stage China–Myanmar TAN, future researchers may want to explore why, when, and under what conditions China–South TANs form, perhaps considering whether regional proximity may influence the viability of a China–South TAN.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…As controversy swirled around the consequences of the Chinese-financed Myitsone hydropower dam in Myanmar, for instance, a network of civil society groups in Myanmar (e.g., Eco Dev) and regional NGOs (e.g., Salween Watch based in Chiang Mai, Thailand) began calling for the termination of the project. In solidarity with this network, Chinese civil society organizations managed to get the Chinese media to cover these anti-dam efforts (Yeophantong, 2013).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The reason is straightforward. Although Chinese civil society organizations are exerting some influence over environmental management inside China (Chen, 2010; Xie, 2011; Zhang, 2018), China does not have NGOs campaigning to improve the overseas human rights and environmental conduct of Chinese corporations (Howell, 2012; Widener, 2011; Yeophantong, 2013). In part, this is because civil society in China faces intense state repression, including government monitoring, limits on critical speech, and strict reporting rules for international collaborations and visits (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2017; Tang & Zhan, 2008).…”

Section: China–ecuadormentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Politics of Transnational Advocacy Against Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian Extractive Projects in the Global South

Shipton

Dauvergne

2021

The Journal of Environment & Development

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Activists in the global South have been navigating two powerful trends since the mid-1990s: intensifying state repression and rising investment in extractive projects from the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). In this context, this article explores the underlying forces determining the formation, endurance, and power of BRICS–South transnational advocacy networks (TANs) opposed to BRICS-based corporate extraction in the global South. By analyzing activism against Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian extractive projects in Ecuador, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, respectively, the research reveals the critical importance of domestic politics and civil society characteristics in both the BRICS and host states for shaping BRICS–South TANs, including which groups assume leadership, the extent of cross-national cooperation, and the role of nonprofits headquartered in the global North. The findings uncover core reasons for the variable resiliency and capacity of BRICS–South TANs, opening up new avenues of research and offering valuable insights for activists and policymakers.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 56%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: China–ecuadormentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Politics of Transnational Advocacy Against Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian Extractive Projects in the Global South

Shipton

Dauvergne

2021

The Journal of Environment & Development

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“…Over one quarter of China’s overseas direct investment is located in recipient countries with high levels of political risk (Zou and Jones 2020 , 93). After high-profile missteps, such as the Myitsone Dam in Myanmar and the Kamchay Dam in Cambodia, Chinese companies are increasingly willing to work with non-state actors to mitigate risk (Maurin and Yeophantong 2013 ; Zou and Jones 2020 ; Yeophantong 2020 ). 18 Working directly with humanitarian organizations, which often have rich operational experience and knowledge of these contexts, as well as strong local networks, can provide greater assurance that projects will proceed despite high political risk.…”

Section: Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Puzzling Partnerships: Overseas Infrastructure Development by Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and Humanitarian Organizations

2022

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Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are now working with humanitarian organizations to develop infrastructure abroad. This emerging phenomenon is puzzling: when, where, and why do Chinese SOEs, best known for constructing massive overseas infrastructure projects for commercial and political gain, execute smaller, lower-profile humanitarian projects? Similarly, why would humanitarian organizations––often with minimal experience in infrastructure contracting––select partners criticized for lack of emphasis on the international standards and best practices that they seek to promote? We address these questions through qualitative case studies of Chinese SOE-humanitarian organization collaboration in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and the Republic of Congo. These cases suggest that such partnerships are more likely when a humanitarian organization has previous experience working in China or with Chinese actors, when Chinese SOEs aim to enter new markets, or when these firms operate in dangerous or politically unstable environments. This study contributes to scholarship on China’s evolving role in international development by providing the first empirical analysis of Chinese SOE-humanitarian organization partnerships.

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Hybrid governance, environmental justice, and hydropower development in the Mekong transboundary commons

Yong

2023

WIREs Water

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The transboundary Mekong River spans China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and provides critical ecosystem services that support millions of people across the river basin. However, the exploitation of its water resources for state‐led development, especially in the realm of hydropower development, not only threatens the livelihoods and food security of communities across the river basin, but also reveal the challenges of governing the Mekong River as a transboundary commons. In focusing on how environmental injustice is produced through hydropower development and the power dynamics within hybrid governance arrangements in the Mekong River Basin, this paper seeks to examine how a grounded perspective of environmental justice may be understood in this context by linkages between the principles of environmental justice and the Mekong literature in three ways. First, the production of, and challenges against distributive injustice in the Mekong River Basin must engage with a strong tradition of scalar analysis in the field of transboundary water governance, particularly in understanding how a politics of scale underlies contestations around the Mekong River. Second, the principle of justice as recognition can be situated within a body of literature that interrogates the politics of knowledge that runs through Mekong water governance, although the co‐production of knowledge types must be acknowledged. Finally, a recent body of literature questioning the legality of dam‐building and public participation around Mekong hydropower dams are closely tied to issues of procedural justice, and reveal the importance of recognizing plurality in ideas around transparency and accountability.This article is categorized under: Human Water > Water Governance Human Water > Water as Imagined and Represented Human Water > Value of Water

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China and the Accountability Politics of Hydropower Development: How Effective are Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Mekong Region?

Cited by 29 publications

References 0 publications

The Politics of Transnational Advocacy Against Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian Extractive Projects in the Global South

The Politics of Transnational Advocacy Against Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian Extractive Projects in the Global South

Puzzling Partnerships: Overseas Infrastructure Development by Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and Humanitarian Organizations

Hybrid governance, environmental justice, and hydropower development in the Mekong transboundary commons

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