Children's recall of generic and specific labels regarding animals and people

Abstract

Although children tend to categorize objects at the basic level, we hypothesized that generic sentences would direct children’s attention to different levels of categorization. We tested children’s and adults’ short-term recall (Study 1) and longer-term recall (Study 2) for labels presented in generic sentences (e.g., Kids like to play jimjam) versus specific sentences (e.g., This kid likes to play jimjam). Label content was either basic level (e.g., cat, boy) or superordinate (e.g., animal, kid). As predicted, participants showed better memory for label content in generic than specific sentences (short-term recall for children; both short and longer-term recall for adults). Errors typically involved recalling specific noun phrases as generic, and recalling superordinate labels as basic. These results demonstrate that language influences children’s representations of new factual information, but that cognitive biases also lead to distortions in recall.

Generics license 30-month-olds’ inferences about the atypical properties of novel kinds.

“…Furthermore, preschoolers treat properties conveyed in generic NPs as more conceptually central to categories than properties conveyed in nongeneric NPs (e.g., Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010; Hollander, Gelman, & Raman, 2009). Finally, preschoolers are more apt to remember generic information versus specific information (e.g., Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Gelman & Raman, 2007; Gülgöz & Gelman, 2015). …”

When Your Kind Cannot Live Here: How Generic Language and Criminal Sanctions Shape Social Categorization

“…The narrator named the three characteristics (i.e., “This one likes …”). A memory cue sheet with the 12 previously-learned about characteristics eliminated memory demands and ensured that generic language did not result in increased recall for the presented information (Gülgöz & Gelman, 2015; see Figure 4). To reiterate, there were no pre-determined Zuttles/non-citizens in the categorization task.…”

Preferences for Explanation Generality Develop Early in Biology But Not Physics

“…We investigated these preferences for explanation generality in biology and physics across three age groups: 5-to 7-year-olds, 11-to 13-year-olds, and adults. Five-to 7-year-olds clearly differentiate between specific and generic language (e.g., Cimpian & Cadena, 2010;Gelman et al, 2002;Graham et al, 2011), show reliable explanatory preferences (particularly for explanatory breadth; Johnston et al, 2017;Samarapungavan, 1992), and conceptualize animal and artifact categories differently (e.g., Gelman, 1988;Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), making them an appropriate younger age group for the current investigation. However, given that some research has shown that children do not begin to show adult-like explanatory preferences until age 11 (Samarapungavan, 1992), we also included a group of 11-to 13-year-olds and a group of adults in our sample.…”

“…Second, and most crucially for the current study, children expect that generic information will extend more widely than token-level information. Even 2year-olds, when introduced to a novel property, are more likely to infer that the property extends to other category members when learning from generic language (e.g., "Blicks drink milk") than specific, token-level language (e.g., "This blick drinks milk"; Graham, Nayer, & Gelman, 2011;see also, Chambers, Graham, & Turner, 2008). In fact, by age 4, children are sensitive to even more nuanced distinctions in the relation between language and scope, inferring that universally quantified noun phrases (e.g., "All bears") extend more widely than generics (e.g., "Bears"; Brandone, Gelman, & Hedglen, 2015;Gelman, Leslie, Was, & Koch, 2015;Gelman et al, 2002;Hollander, Gelman, & Star, 2002).…”

“…Alternatively, children may show a different preference entirely-for basic-level explanations. Prior work has shown that from preschool to adulthood, there is a bias to remember (G€ ulg€ oz & Gelman, 2015), learn about (Mervis & Crisafi, 1982;Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976), and generalize to (Gelman & O'Reilly, 1988) basic-level categories. If this bias toward the basic level extends to explanation as well, then we should find evidence that children prefer basic-level explanations more than either token-level or superordinate-level explanations.…”