Chemicals Denial—A Challenge to Science and Policy

Abstract

Much research shows that science denial regarding climate change is widespread and problematic for science and scientists, as well as for policy-makers. Climate denial delays goal achievement. As shown in this article, science denial commonly occurs also in the field of chemicals assessment and policy, but the research on the topic is scarce. The peer-reviewed studies that exist mostly concern a limited number of specific cases, such as DDT, CFCs and endocrine disrupting chemicals. The characteristics of ‘chemicals denial’ show similarity with those of climate denial, including reliance on fake experts, cherry-picked facts and attacks on scientists, with a key aspect being the questioning of causal relationships. Considering the gaps between chemicals policy goals and the state of the environment, further scientific exploration in the field is needed. Developing a better coordinated research agenda and a common terminology are therefore warranted strategies. A key concept in such endeavors could be ‘chemicals denial’.

Mind the gap: Coping with delay in environmental governance

“…1 One example is hazardous substances, where some stakeholders manufacture doubt on harmful effects of endocrine-disrupting substances (Bergman et al 2015). This resembles the ozone layer depletion story, and many other examples of chemicals denial (EEA 2001(EEA , 2013Karlsson 2019). 2 Furthermore, in the area of wildlife conservation, researchers have claimed misuse of scientific results in different cases spanning from wolves in Sweden (Chapron 2014), over lions in Africa (Lindsey et al 2013) and protection of boreal caribou in Canada (Boan et al 2018), to exploitation of tropical peatlands (Wijedasa et al 2017).…”

“…It is similarly important to give attention to the surrounding environment of stakeholders, which evidently includes actors with different roles and agendas. Some of these, for example, operate to organise science denial actively (Edvardsson et al 2017;Karlsson 2019), whereas other strive within agencies, ministries and public inquiries to cope with decision thresholds (Karlsson and Westling 2017;Karlsson et al unpublished). There is thus a need to identify and highlight the roles of different stakeholder groups, for example, in relation to science denial and decision thresholds.…”

Open Science in regulatory environmental risk assessment

“…Regulatory agencies evaluate whether the applicants have performed studies and the ERA in line with this guidance and request additional data and/or adjust the ERA if deemed appropriate. However, there is public skepticism toward regulatory ERA (Hunka et al, 2012 ; Kabat, 2017 ; Karlsson, 2019 ; Lofstedt, 2013 ; Voulvoulis & Burgman, 2019 ; Hunt & Wald 2020 ). Possible reasons are diverse and include: Conflicting opinions about what should be regarded as harm.…”

“…Regulatory agencies evaluate whether the applicants have performed studies and the ERA in line with this guidance and request additional data and/or adjust the ERA if deemed appropriate. However, there is public skepticism toward regulatory ERA (Hunka et al, 2012; Kabat, 2017; Karlsson, 2019; Lofstedt, 2013; Voulvoulis & Burgman, 2019; Hunt & Wald 2020). Possible reasons are diverse and include: Conflicting opinions about what should be regarded as harm. Disagreements about the strength, relevance, and reliability of evidence used in ERAs. Distrust of experts involved in generating and evaluating such evidence. Perception that contradictory conclusions have been reached by different regulatory authorities and/or under different regulatory frameworks. Lack of transparency about the decision‐making process and the evidence used. Growing public demand to be involved and have a say in regulatory decisions that affect them.…”