Checking Out: The Effects of Bank Overdrafts on the 1992 House Elections

Jacobson, Gary C.; Dimock, Michael A.

doi:10.2307/2111599

Cited by 138 publications

(106 citation statements)

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“…Incumbents with 100 or more reported bad checks in the House Bank scandal were coded as one, with others coded as zero. We chose 100 as the dividing line based on research that indicated that that number was of crucial significance in the 1992 elections (Jacobson and Dimock 1994 expect that the worst offenders in the Bank Scandal-100 or more kited checks-will suffer vote loss in the election.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Table 3 presents results of our two-stage least squares model with incumbent percentage of the two-party vote as the dependent variable. Variables that are included are ones typically found in congressional election models such as the incumbent's previous vote, district partisanship, incumbent and challenger spending, 8 and variable "checks" to help capture the influence of the House bank scandal (Jacobson and Dimock 1994). Dummy variables are also included for each year and challenger party, using Democratic challengers in 1992 as the baseline year and pure amateur as the baseline for challenger quality.…”

Section: Are All Amateurs Equal? 489mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Are All Amateurs Equal? Candidate Quality in the 1992–1998 House Elections

Roberds

Roberts

2002

Politics & Policy

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Are All Amateurs Equal? 489mentioning

confidence: 99%

Are All Amateurs Equal? Candidate Quality in the 1992–1998 House Elections

Roberds

Roberts

2002

Politics & Policy

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“…This leads to our second hypothesis, that being a marginal candidate is more likely to be associated with the possibility of being forced out of the legislative offices during their term in office. (Brace, 1985;Groseclose and Krehbiel, 1994;Hall and Van Houweling, 1995;Jacobson and Dimock, 1994;Kiewiet and Zeng, 1993). Moore and Hibbing (1988) argue that, aged members, electorally vulnerable members, minority party members, or ideological misfits in relation to their party are more inclined to leave Congress.…”

Section: Theories Of Legislative Careersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prior Margins of Victory and Legislative Careers: Competing Risks Regression Analysis in South Korean National Assembly, 1988–2015

Kim¹,

Park²

2017

korea Observer - inst n.a stud

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How do prior margins of victory influence the longevity and exit patterns of legislative careers in . Our statistical findings show that higher vote margins in the previous election decrease the chance of electoral defeat in the next election. Legislators with narrow vote margins are positively associated with a higher likelihood of enforced removal from office by the * * This study was partially funded.

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“…Some of the literature indicates that when citizens support corrupt politicians, they do so due to lack of information or to coordination issues. However, actual facts show that even informed citizens may support dishonest politicians (Manzetti and Wilson, 2007;Jacobson and Dimock, 1994;Dimock and Jacobson, 1995;Stoker, 1993).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Yo prefiero al corrupto el perfil de los ciudadanos que eligen políticos deshonestos pero competentes

Rosón¹

2024

REIS

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ResumenLos resultados electorales muestran que los electores no siempre castigan a los políticos corruptos en las urnas y son capaces de votar a un político corrupto si este es competente. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar las características que diferencian a los ciudadanos que están dispuestos a apoyar a los corruptos de los electores que no lo están a partir de datos de opinión pública en Costa Rica. Los resultados muestran que hay cuatro variables que diferencian ambos grupos: los conocimientos políticos, los ingresos, la edad y el género. Las mujeres y los ciudadanos con más conocimientos políticos eligen políticos deshonestos pero competentes en menor medida que los hombres y aquellos ciudadanos con menos conocimientos políticos. Por el contrario, los jóvenes y los ciudadanos con más ingresos están dispuestos a compensar la falta de honradez con más competencia en mayor medida que los adultos y aquellos con menores ingresos. Key words AbstractElectoral results show that voters do not always punish corrupt politicians at the ballot box and some will vote for corrupt candidates if they are competent. The aim of this paper is to analyse the characteristics that differentiate between citizens who are prepared to support corrupt politicians from voters who are not, based on public opinion data from Costa Rica. The results show that four variables differentiate between the two groups: political knowledge, income, age and gender. Women and citizens with more political knowledge choose dishonest but competent politicians to a lesser extent than men and those with low levels of political knowledge. However, young people and citizens with higher income levels are willing to allow dishonesty to be offset by better competence to a greater extent than adults and those with low income. Cómo citarMartínez Rosón, María del Mar (2016). «Yo prefi ero al corrupto: el perfi l de los ciudadanos que eligen políticos deshonestos pero competentes». 78Yo prefi ero al corrupto: el perfi l de los ciudadanos que eligen políticos deshonestos pero competentes INTRODUCCIÓN 1En general, los ciudadanos cuando piensan en un buen político lo defi nen como alguien honrado y competente (Funk, 1999;Kinder, 1983;Kinder et al., 1980). Sin embargo, a la vez se producen resultados electorales sorprendentes, donde candidatos que se alejan de ese perfi l de buen político son premiados en las urnas con el apoyo electoral sufi ciente como para resultar (re)electos. Esto sucede porque si bien la defi nición de un buen político se hace sobre una lista de características ideales que los ciudadanos ordenan en función de la importancia que otorgan a cada una, en la vida real tienen que elegir entre candidatos con una determinada combinación de características y no siempre ambas, honradez y competencia, se encuentran juntas.El objetivo de este artículo es indagar en qué forma se produce esa elección, tratando de analizar qué cualidades son susceptibles de ser sacrifi cadas en presencia de otras, así como conocer los factores que afectan a esa elecci...

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Checking Out: The Effects of Bank Overdrafts on the 1992 House Elections

Cited by 138 publications

References 3 publications

Are All Amateurs Equal? Candidate Quality in the 1992–1998 House Elections

Are All Amateurs Equal? Candidate Quality in the 1992–1998 House Elections

Prior Margins of Victory and Legislative Careers: Competing Risks Regression Analysis in South Korean National Assembly, 1988–2015

Yo prefiero al corrupto el perfil de los ciudadanos que eligen políticos deshonestos pero competentes

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