Chechnya and the Russian Military: A War Too Far?

Baev, Pavel

doi:10.7135/upo/9781843313618.008

Cited by 3 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…The Chechen campaigns and the fight with the diffused insurgency which followed resulted in legally assigning counterinsurgency and counterterrorism as essential duties of military and law enforcement agencies in Russia (FL 3 2011~FL 35 2006~FL 40 1995~President Decree 146 2010~President Decree 960 2003). Counter measures applied during the two wars by military forces were gradually transferred to the Federal Security Service and then to federal and regional subdivisions of the Ministry of Interior, thus shifting the strategy from a military solution to a primarily law enforcement one (Baev 2005;International Crisis Group 2012a;Koehler, Gunya, and Alkhazurov 2016;Zhukov 2012). The stakeholders engaged in counterterrorism include, but are not limited to, the National Antiterrorism Committee, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations.…”

Section: Continuing Repression? Tactical Evolution Of Russian Countermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To deal with fighters, governmental institutions incorporated more targeted operations (Hughes 2007, 112-113). This tactic was usually referred to as "zachistki" or "sweeps" (Baev 2005;Grodnenskii 2010;Lyall 2010;Souleimanov and Siroky 2016;Zhukov 2012). Federal positions were significantly advanced by gradual engagement of ex-fighters in counterinsurgency operations (Ratelle and Souleimanov 2016;Smfd and Mares 2015;Souleimanov and Aliyev 2014, 23).…”

Section: Continuing Repression? Tactical Evolution Of Russian Countermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This section examines the variety of tactics embodied in Russian counter-strategy tailored for peacetime settings. It builds on the previous research of bombings (Grodnenskii 2010;Lyall 2009;Souleimanov 2015;Trenin, Malashenko, and Lieven 2004); special operations, or "zachistki" ("sweeps") (Baev 2005;Lyall 2010;Zhukov 2012); ability to identify and neutralize IEDs and mines (Thomas 2005); and group of tactics such as denial, measures restraining physical channels of communication between peaceful and violent zones "through cordoning, roadblocks, and similar quarantine-like measures" (Toft and Zhukov 2012); and measures associated with punitive operations "such as search-and-destroy missions, artillery shelling, air strikes, and raids at sites of recent violence" (Toft and Zhukov 2012). However, the section goes further and analyzes the variety of disaggregated tactics combining both direct and indirect counterterrorist tools.…”

Section: Graphmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The paper embraces the range of tactics, including preventive ones such as seizures and detections. Combining them together with "hard" repressive methods (Baev 2005;Lyall 2009, 2010~Zhukov 2012) provides a fuller picture of the extent to which repression in various formats has been applied in the region.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Protecting the state: Russian repressive tactics in the North Caucasus

Zhirukhina

2018

Natl. pap.

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Since the end of the second Chechen campaign, the North Caucasus counterinsurgency has experienced the shift from military involvement toward prevalence of law enforcement instruments. This paper discusses the composition of repressive tactics that the Russian state developed as a result of the two decades long evolution of a counter strategy designed to eliminate illegal armed groups operating in the North Caucasus. It is focused on the late stages of conflict (2007-2014) when the violence that had spread across the region started in the early 2000s had symbolically culminated in 2007 with the proclamation of the Caucasian Emirate. This paper advances a reconceptualization of the Russian counterinsurgency by devising an analysis of indiscriminate and discriminate repressive tactics. It demonstrates that security agencies incorporated more selective uses of violence into their tactics, thereby reducing the number of indiscriminate violent actions to an insignificant level. Moreover, along with selective violence, security institutions reinforced their effort by conducting preventive work such as the detection of secret caches of weapons, seizures, and arrests. Findings regarding the current composition of repressive tactics are illustrated by means of new disaggregated media-based data that were especially collected and analyzed to form the basis of this research.

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Section: Continuing Repression? Tactical Evolution Of Russian Countermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Continuing Repression? Tactical Evolution Of Russian Countermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Graphmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Protecting the state: Russian repressive tactics in the North Caucasus

Zhirukhina

2018

Natl. pap.

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“…A number of observers claim that both Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus are increasingly outside the Kremlin's control (e.g. Baev 2006; Dunlop and Menon 2006; Kramer 2005). According to one estimate, at least seventeen insurgent organisations of varying sizes were active in the Northern Caucasus in 2005 (Lyall 2006).…”

Section: Why Compare Bosnia‐herzegovina and The North Caucasus?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Social distance in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and the North Caucasus region of Russia: Inter and intra‐ethnic attitudes and identities^*

Bakke

Cao

Ο’Loughlin

et al. 2009

Nations and Nationalism

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. This article examines attitudinal differences and similarities among ethnic groups in conflict‐affected societies. Conventional wisdom tells us that societies that have experienced violent struggles in which individuals of different ethnic groups have (been) mobilized against each other are likely to become polarized along ethnic lines. Indeed, both policy‐makers and scholars often assume that such divisions are some of the main challenges that must be overcome to restore peace after war. We comparatively examine this conventional wisdom by mapping dimensions of social distance among 4,000 survey respondents in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and the North Caucasus region of Russia. The surveys were carried out in December 2005. Using multidimensional scaling methods, we do not find patterns of clear attitudinal cleavages among members of different ethnic groups in Bosnia‐Herzegovina. Nor do we find patterns of clear ethnic division in the North Caucasus, although our social distance matrices reveal a difference between Russians and ethnic minority groups.

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Shifting Dynamics of the Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in the North Caucasus

Dannreuther

2014

Ethnopolitics

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This paper seeks to provide an explanation of the shifts and trends in the insurgency and Russian counter-insurgency strategy in the North Caucasus. The article first identifies the multiple factors that initially contributed to the radicalization and Islamization of the conflict in Chechnya and how this fostered increased instability in the North Caucasus by the late 1990s, representing a serious threat to the security and integrity of the Russian state. The subsequent section sets out how the incoming prime minister and then president Vladimir Putin seized on the growing crisis in the North Caucasus to develop and refine a new strategy that not only gained the support of the general Russian public, but also was a critical factor in cementing his personal popularity. The strategy also had some notable successes, not least in the relative pacification of Chechnya and the start of the reconstruction of the war-damaged republic. However, the strategy also had its less successful and more negative consequences, which have revived and changed the nature of the insurgency towards a more Islamist and diffuse character and presented new challenges for Russia's counter-insurgency strategy. The final section makes a division between the social, economic and political factors and the religious and ideological factors that are driving the insurgency and argues that greater weight should be accorded to the religious and ideological factors than is often accorded by analysts.

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Chechnya and the Russian Military: A War Too Far?

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Protecting the state: Russian repressive tactics in the North Caucasus

Protecting the state: Russian repressive tactics in the North Caucasus

Social distance in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and the North Caucasus region of Russia: Inter and intra‐ethnic attitudes and identities^*

Shifting Dynamics of the Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in the North Caucasus

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Chechnya and the Russian Military: A War Too Far?

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Protecting the state: Russian repressive tactics in the North Caucasus

Protecting the state: Russian repressive tactics in the North Caucasus

Social distance in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and the North Caucasus region of Russia: Inter and intra‐ethnic attitudes and identities*

Shifting Dynamics of the Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in the North Caucasus

Contact Info

Product

Resources

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Social distance in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and the North Caucasus region of Russia: Inter and intra‐ethnic attitudes and identities^*