Characterizations of a game theoretical cost allocation method

Otten, G.J.M.

doi:10.1007/bf01414213

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This approach considers the remaining alternate cost of other coalitions for the allocation of NSC, whereas SCRB considers the remaining alternate cost of one user only [38].…”

Section: Alternate Cost Avoided Methods (Aca)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling and Comparative Analysis of Multi-Agent Cost Allocation Strategies Using Cooperative Game Theory for the Modern Electricity Market

et al. 2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The electrical market scenario has changed drastically in the last decade. In the presence of increased competition and less tolerant players, more sophisticated methods are required to balance the diversity and differential pricing while promoting cooperation among the agents. In the monopolistic environment, the central utility incurred the total cost of the transmission expansion. But as the current scenario demands, there are several public and private market players. The growth will benefit all the players, so the total cost in transmission expansion can be divided among players as per the benefit received by each player. In this paper, a transmission system expansion planning problem in the cooperative environment using cooperative game theory (CGT) is framed for the power sector, in which various players can cooperate in a coordinated manner to maximize their benefit but ultimately strengthen the power grid. In this paper, we have modeled, analyzed and compared various cost allocation methods of cooperative game theory specifically for the cost allocation in a transmission expansion planning problem. The present work focuses on forming coalitions to calculate the costs using the forward search and frog leap optimization approach. We have compared the SCRB, BSV, ENSC, and ACA methods for transmission expansion planning while attempting to satisfy the axioms. We have also observed that bilateral Shapely value efficiently allocated the costs due to its decentralized approach and the sequencing of coalition formations to achieve the best possible cost allocations.

show abstract

“…This approach considers the remaining alternate cost of other coalitions for the allocation of NSC, whereas SCRB considers the remaining alternate cost of one user only [38].…”

Section: Alternate Cost Avoided Methods (Aca)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling and Comparative Analysis of Multi-Agent Cost Allocation Strategies Using Cooperative Game Theory for the Modern Electricity Market

et al. 2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A variant of the SCRB method, the Alternative Cost Avoided (ACA) method, is studied by Straffin and Heaney (1981) and Otten (1993), and is given by…”

Section: Comparison With the Separable Costs Remaining Benefits (Scrb) Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We show that the unique efficient solution that satisfies this weak balanced externalities axiom is the proportional allocation of nonseparable contribution (PANSC) value, which allocates the payoffs proportional to the separable costs (Moulin, 1985) of the players. It is interesting to note that this value is closely related to the Separable Costs Remaining Benefits (SCRB) method (Young et al, 1982) and Alternative Cost Avoided (ACA) method (Straffin and Heaney, 1981;Otten, 1993) in cost allocation problems. The SCRB method is commonly used in practice, for example in allocating the costs of multi-purpose water development projects (Straffin and Heaney, 1981;Young et al, 1982).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Balanced Externalities and the Proportional Allocation of Nonseparable Contributions

Brink

Chun²,

Funaki

et al. 2021

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we study the implications of extending the balanced cost reduction property from queueing problems to general games. As a direct translation of the balanced cost reduction property, the axiom of balanced externalities for solutions of games, requires that the payoff of any player is equal to the total externality she inflicts on the other players with her presence. We show that this axiom and efficiency together characterize the Shapley value for 2-additive games. However, extending this axiom in a straightfoward way to general games is incompatible with efficiency. Keeping as close as possible to the idea behind balanced externalities, we weaken this axiom by requiring that every player's payoff is the same fraction of its total externality inflicted on the other players. This weakening, which we call weak balanced externalities, turns out to be compatible with efficiency. More specifically, the unique efficient solution that satisfies this weaker property is the proportional allocation of nonseparable contribution (PANSC) value, which allocates the total worth proportional to the separable costs of the players. We also provide characterizations of the PANSC value using a reduced game consistency axiom.

show abstract

“…an established method for cost allocation going back to Ransmeier (1942), along the lines of Straffin and Heaney (1981). The ACA method has been widely discussed, see also Otten (1993), Tijs and Driessen (1996) and Young (1994). The ACA method is based on the concept of allocating separable costs…”

Section: Application To Cost Games and Relations To The Aca-methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conditions for the uniqueness of the Gately point for cooperative games

Staudacher¹,

Anwander²

2019

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We are studying the Gately point, an established solution concept for cooperative games. We point out that there are superadditive games for which the Gately point is not unique, i.e. in general the concept is rather set-valued than an actual point. We derive conditions under which the Gately point is guaranteed to be a unique imputation and provide a geometric interpretation. The Gately point can be understood as the intersection of a line defined by two points with the set of imputations. Our uniqueness conditions guarantee that these two points do not coincide. We provide demonstrative interpretations for negative propensities to disrupt. We briefly show that our uniqueness conditions for the Gately point include quasibalanced games and discuss the relation of the Gately point to the τ -value in this context. Finally, we point out relations to cost games and the ACA method and end upon a few remarks on the implementation of the Gately point and an upcoming software package for cooperative game theory.

show abstract

Characterizations of a game theoretical cost allocation method

Cited by 8 publications

References 21 publications

Modeling and Comparative Analysis of Multi-Agent Cost Allocation Strategies Using Cooperative Game Theory for the Modern Electricity Market

Modeling and Comparative Analysis of Multi-Agent Cost Allocation Strategies Using Cooperative Game Theory for the Modern Electricity Market

Balanced Externalities and the Proportional Allocation of Nonseparable Contributions

Conditions for the uniqueness of the Gately point for cooperative games

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About