Characteristics of Institutional Investors and Discretionary Accruals

Cheng, C.S. Agnes; Reitenga, Austin L.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.277717

Cited by 28 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Cheng and Reitenga (2009) find the similar findings. They predict that ACTB (Active institutional block holders) will want to utilize their controlling ability only when EP (Earning Pressure) is strong.…”

Section: Earnings Management and Institutional Ownershipsupporting

confidence: 73%

The Effects of Corporate Ownership Structure and Board Size on Earnings Management: Evidence from Turkey

Aygün¹,

İç²,

Sayim³

2014

IJBM

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This study investigates the impact of corporate ownership structure and board size on earnings management for a sample of Turkish firms registered on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) for the period of 2009 to 2012. The corporate ownership structure is measured with two variables: managerial ownership and institutional ownership. The board size can be defined as the number of members in the board. This study also uses three controlled variables: return on assets, size of the firm and financial leverage. The adjusted Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) and the multivariate regression technique are utilized to examine the effect of corporate ownership structure and board size on earnings management. The results consistent with the previous studies show that the institutional ownership and the board size have a negative significant effect on the earnings management while the effect of the managerial ownership on the earnings management has positively statistically significant. The findings also reveal that the return on assets has a positively statistically significant effect on earnings management. However, the impact of the financial leverage on earnings management is negatively statistically significant.

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Section: Earnings Management and Institutional Ownershipsupporting

confidence: 73%

The Effects of Corporate Ownership Structure and Board Size on Earnings Management: Evidence from Turkey

Aygün¹,

İç²,

Sayim³

2014

IJBM

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“…The greater the institutional ownership the lower the earnings management practice. This research is also supported by research conducted by (Ping & Koh, 2006); (Cheng & Reitenga, 2009); (Tiswiyanti et al, 2012);(Wiryadi. & Sebrina., 2013); (Agustia, 2013); (Kusumaningtyas, 2014); (Yendrawati & Yuanifa, 2015); and (Ebraheem, 2016).…”

Section: Effect Of Institutional Ownership On Earnings Managementsupporting

confidence: 71%

“…In this study institutional ownership is measured by the percentage of shares held by the institution in a company. This research is also supported by research conducted by (Ping & Koh, 2006); (Cheng & Reitenga, 2009); (Tiswiyanti, Fitriyani, & Wiralestari, 2012); (Wiryadi & Sebrina, 2013); (Agustia, 2013); (Kusumaningtyas, 2014); (Yendrawati & Yuanifa, 2015); and (Ebraheem, 2016) The research on the effect of leverage on earnings management conducted by Anagnostopoulou & Tsekrekos, (2017) regarding the effect of financial leverage on real accrual-based earnings management with samples on public companies in Greece 99 shows that leverage has a positive effect on earnings management, using debt to equity ratio as a measure of leverage. The results of this study are also supported by research conducted by Jones and (Jones & Sharma, 2001); (Naftalia & Marsono, 2013) (Agustia, 2013); (Mahiswari & Nugroho, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 61%

The Influence of Institutional Ownership, Leverage, and Audit Committee on Earnings Management: Evidence of Companies Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange

Perdana¹

2019

JAROE

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Objective – This research aimed to analyze: 1) The influence of institutional ownership to earnings management, 2) The influence of leverage to earnings management dan 3) The influence of audit committee. Design/methodology – Population in this research is entire companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 2015-2017. Election of the sample with the purposive sampling method and is obtained by the amount of sample counted 194 company. This research used secondary data. The analysis used is multiple linear regression and t-test, to seek the influence of institutional ownership, leverage, and audit committee to earnings management. Results – Result of examination indicate that: 1) Institutional ownership had a significant effect to earnings management, with direction is positive 2) Leverage had a significant effect to earnings management, with direction is negative and 3) audit committee had a significant effect to earnings management, with direction is positive.

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“…Recent studies conclude that corporate governance can mitigate deliberate intervention in the accounting process (Klein 2002;Koh 2003;Cheng and Reitenga 2006). Bartov et al (2004) acknowledge that underreporting volatility may be too costly for all firms because management must justify volatility choices to auditors and the board of directors.…”

Section: Measuring the Relation Between Discretion And Managerial Incmentioning

confidence: 99%

Employee Stock Option Fair‐Value Estimates: Do Managerial Discretion and Incentives Explain Accuracy?*

Hodder

Mayew

McAnally

et al. 2006

Contemporary Accting Res

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We examine the determinants of managers' use of discretion over employee stock option (ESO) valuation‐model inputs that determine ESO fair values. We also explore the consequences of such discretion. Firms exercise considerable discretion over all model inputs, and this discretion results in material differences in ESO fair‐value estimates. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that a large proportion of firms exercise value‐increasing discretion. Importantly, we find that using discretion improves predictive accuracy for about half of our sample firms. Moreover, we find that both opportunistic and informational managerial incentives together explain the accuracy of firms' ESO fair‐value estimates. Partitioning on the direction of discretion improves our understanding of managerial incentives. Our analysis confirms that financial statement readers can use mandated contextual disclosures to construct powerful ex ante predictions of ex post accuracy.

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Characteristics of Institutional Investors and Discretionary Accruals

Cited by 28 publications

References 25 publications

The Effects of Corporate Ownership Structure and Board Size on Earnings Management: Evidence from Turkey

The Effects of Corporate Ownership Structure and Board Size on Earnings Management: Evidence from Turkey

The Influence of Institutional Ownership, Leverage, and Audit Committee on Earnings Management: Evidence of Companies Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange

Employee Stock Option Fair‐Value Estimates: Do Managerial Discretion and Incentives Explain Accuracy?*

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