Chapter 59

Swain, Freddie R.; Shapiro, Gary

doi:10.1093/med/9780199393947.003.0059

Spine Imaging 2016

DOI: 10.1093/med/9780199393947.003.0059

|View full text |Cite

Chapter 59

Freddie R. Swain¹,

Gary Shapiro²

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Publication Types

Select...

Other1

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent1

Authors

Journals

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…On 16 January 1991, the US led Coalition initiated what would be a 42 day long air campaign directed primarily at strategic targets in Iraq and operational Iraqi military forces in Kuwait. The air campaign resulted in gaining air superiority and reduced combat power by over 50% in front-line Iraqi units.Additionally, the destruction of critical Iraqi early warning and air defense systems, communications networks, and transportation infrastructure isolated Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations 77. On 20 February 1991, President Bush gave Iraq four days to withdraw, then followed up on 22 February with an ultimatum to begin withdrawal within 24 hours or73 Ibid., 1-5. accept the consequences.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding and Accounting for National Will in Strategies that Use Military Forces

McGowan¹

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)02-04-2015 REPORT TYPEMaster's Thesis ABSTRACTNational will is crucial to the successful use of military force; and therefore military strategists and policy makers must understand and continuously account for the impact of national will throughout strategy development and implementation. The paper examines a basic model for explaining strategy from the Army War College and suggests how to improve it by incorporating national will as the foundation that both the political objectives and military strategy must rest upon. A strategy is more likely to succeed when national will is understood and accounted for because it helps achieve a critical balance between the people, military, and government.While ongoing military operations convey a pessimistic outlook on the United States' ability to successfully develop and implement strategy, there are several recent examples of success that highlight the importance of understanding and incorporating national will into strategy. Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as well as, Operations Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide excellent examples, of how political objectives, military strategy, and national will are properly synthesized and balanced throughout strategy development and implementation to ensure success. US military operations in Somalia provide a valuable lesson in how taking this critical balance between objective, military strategy, and national will for granted, even after it is obtained, can cause it to be lost and lead to strategic failure. This paper argues that national will is crucial to the successful use of military force; and therefore military strategists and policy makers must understand and continuously account for the impact of national will throughout strategy development and implementation. After highlighting recent challenges regarding the use of military force by the United States, the paper examines a basic model for explaining strategy from the Army War College. While the model is useful in capturing the synergy that must exist between political and military objectives and strategic risk derived from compat...

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding and Accounting for National Will in Strategies that Use Military Forces

McGowan¹

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

hi@scite.ai

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

Chapter 59

Cited by 1 publication

References 0 publications

Understanding and Accounting for National Will in Strategies that Use Military Forces

Understanding and Accounting for National Will in Strategies that Use Military Forces

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About