Chapter 4 Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab

Aproximaciones Psicosociales a la Corrupción: Una Revisión Teórica

“…En otras palabras, si los incentivos no monetarios también influyen en la conducta corrupta, las intervenciones para reducir la corrupción que se basen exclusivamente en atacarlos están destinadas a fracasar, sobre todo en países o instituciones donde la corrupción es sistémica y, por lo mismo, aceptada socialmente (Abbink & Serra, 2012).…”

Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology

“…Corruption is as difficult to study in the field as is tax evasion, which motivates studying corruption in the lab (for surveys see Dusek, Ortmann et al 2005, Abbink and Serra 2012, Lambsdorff 2012, Bobkova and Egbert 2013. A typical experimental implementation is Abbink, Irlenbusch et al (2002): A first participant decides whether she wants to transfer a certain amount (the bribe) to a second participant.…”

Is Transparency an Anti-Corruption Myth?

“…Many researchers have therefore turned to a more controlled laboratory setting to look for evidence of the effects of anti-corruption policies (see Abbink & Serra (2012) for a review of this literature). In this paper we study the importance of the visibility of back-scratching on corruption in the laboratory, where corruption entails a reciprocation of favours between parties that incurs a cost on others.…”

“…1 The game we use to study transparency is an extension of Murray et al (2015) and sits in between the traditional experimental corruption literature centred around the repeated bribery game (RBG) of Abbink et al (2002), and a number of literatures on coordination in repeated games such as the public goods game, and games of group formation and in-group bias (Abbink & Serra, 2012;Burnham, 2003;Andreoni & Petrie, 2004;Hewstone et al , 2002;Efferson et al , 2008;Abbink et al , 2002;Lambsdorff & Frank, 2010;van Veldhuizen, 2011;Schikora, 2011;Burnham, 2003;Charness & Gneezy, 2008).…”