Chapter 4 A Single Standard for Coalitions: Lowest Common Denominator or Highest Standard?

Breau, Susan

doi:10.1163/9789004215900_005

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“…The same is arguably the case for non-state armed groups or international organisations, even though this issue remains complex. 9 For a comprehensive discussion of interoperability, seeBreau 2011and Stein 2003. 10 ILC 2006 ('most frequently cited examples of jus cogens norms are the prohibition of aggression, slavery and the slave trade, genocide, racial discrimination apartheid and torture, as well as basic rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, and the right to self-determination').…”

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Taking One for the Team: Legal Consequences of Misconduct by Partners

Wiesener

2020

Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies

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As Nordic states and their allies embark on ever more challenging military operations abroad, the complexity of the applicable rules-and legal consequences they may have-is growing rapidly. In addition to the specific terms of the mandate and the underlying principles of the UN Charter, there are two regimes that govern the conduct of military and other security forces across the war-peace spectrum: the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and international human rights law (IHRL). The exact application of these regimes and their interaction remain matters of debate. Yet, the most vexing question is: what happens when it is not one state's own forces, but those of a partner that run afoul the LOAC and IHRL standards? This article maps and disentangles the relevant international rules and regimes under which responsibility may arise for states due to abuse committed by their partners in military operations abroad. It considers the general rules of state responsibility-in particular, the rule on state complicity-and the relevant substantive rules under the LOAC and IHRL as well as the Arms Trade Treaty and the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. By and large, states have to abstain from any form of assistance that could contribute to the commission of IHRL and LOAC violations by their partners. Under certain circumstances, they even have to actively and continuously assess the risk of such misconduct occurring and take mitigating measures. Nevertheless, these obligations do not necessarily translate into an effective system of accountability.

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confidence: 99%