Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation

Armstrong, Mark; Sappington, David E. M.

doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5

Cited by 274 publications

(198 citation statements)

References 294 publications

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“…Available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_consult/review/staffworkingdocu ment_final.pdf. 5 For penetrating surveys see Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Armstrong and Sappington (2007), who also survey non-Bayesian mechanisms. 6 For a critique of the Bayesian approach, see Vogelsang (2006).…”

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confidence: 99%

Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change

Vogelsang¹

2012

Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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confidence: 99%

Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change

Vogelsang¹

2012

Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks

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“…See also Besley and Case (2000), Duso and Roller (2003), Beck et al (2001). 2 See Sappington (2003 and. These authors claim that even in those cases where competition is superior to regulation, we should expect the transition towards competition to be a "long and winding road."…”

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confidence: 99%

Telecommunications Policies: Measurement and Determinants

Gual¹,

Trillas²

2006

Review of Network Economics

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This paper presents new data on telecommunications reform for a cross section of countries. We measure telecommunications reform along two dimensions: entry barriers and regulatory independence. This data set is combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze the determinants of telecommunications policies. We find that entry barriers are positively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist legal tradition, but they are unrelated to the partisan ideology of reforming governments. We also find that countries with weak protection of investors' quasi-rents by other means, and countries with a larger incumbent, are more prone to create independent regulatory agencies, although the latter is a weaker result.

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“…Joskow (2005) suggests that this might not be the case in electricity networks. 7 In their excellent review, Armstrong and Sappington (2007) give an overview of various aspects in which rate of return and price cap regulation might differ. 8 Cambini and Yiang (2009) review the evidence linking incentive regulation and investments.…”

Section: Policy Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulation of network infrastructure investments: an experimental evaluation

2012

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This paper reports the results of an experiment evaluating three regulatory schemes for network infrastructure, in terms of their ability to generate efficient levels of capacity investment. We compare the performance of (1) price cap regulation, (2) a regulatory holiday for new capacity, and (3) price cap regulation with long term contracts combined with a secondary market. The setting is one in which network users can benefit from acting strategically, and are better informed than the network operator about demand growth. We find that the regulatory holiday creates an incentive to underinvest relative to optimal levels. Long term contracts also fail to improve on single price-cap regulation, and may reduce investment by providing noisier signals about future demand.

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Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation

Cited by 274 publications

References 294 publications

Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change

Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change

Telecommunications Policies: Measurement and Determinants

Regulation of network infrastructure investments: an experimental evaluation

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