Chapter 20 Taxation for developing countries

Ahmad, Ehtisham; Stern, Nicholas

doi:10.1016/s1573-4471(89)02007-3

Cited by 34 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…In contrast, foreign trade usually¯ows through a few ports, and even when it does not, it is easier to police a border and collect taxes on goods passing across it than to seek out a large number of owners of small ®rms or ensure that they produce accurate tax returns. Administration is thus a central problem, and according to Ahmad and Stern (1989) many developing countries would have diculty in levying taxes at the retail stage. In addition to these observations, Anderson (1997) has 106 MOUTOS 9 I wish to thank John McLaren for alerting me to this possibility.…”

Section: Choosing Between Income Taxes and Tariffs In A Representativmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do Poor democracies Collect a Lot of Tariff Revenue?

Moutos

2001

Economics & Politics

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Governments in developing countries typically collect a signi®cantly higher proportion of their revenue in the form of trade taxes, than their developed country counterparts. This paper provides a political±economic explanation for this phenomenon. A model of trade in vertically dierentiated products is used in order to determine the preferences of the households among dierent ways of raising government revenue. It is shown that the majority of households in poor countries will consume low-quality, domestically produced varieties of dierentiated products and would thus register a preference for the government to rely more on tari rather than income tax revenue in order to ®nance its operations.

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Section: Choosing Between Income Taxes and Tariffs In A Representativmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do Poor democracies Collect a Lot of Tariff Revenue?

Moutos

2001

Economics & Politics

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“…in the direction of taxing land at a differentially higher rate than improvements" . But going a step further to pure site value taxation "can be perilous for the government, possibly also for the economist, and damage his credibility as an advisor" (Ahmad andStern, 1989, p . 1075) .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Land Prices and Housing in Manila

Strassmann

Blunt

Tomas³

1994

Urban Studies

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For decades, exceptionally high land prices in Metropolitan Manila have co-existed with much vacant urban land . A 1991 survey of 3003 households suggests, however, that, by the standards of other countries, neither dwelling prices nor rents are high in Manila compared with family incomes . Relatively high land prices have instead led households to spend much less on structures and to accept low housing welfare although the availability of skilled construction labour, materials and finance has been fairly good and improving . Households must also endure much settlement insecurity and residential immobility worse than international norms . High land prices are related to negligible property taxation and to impediments to land markets and infrastructure development .

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“…The same kind of reasons that hamper the ability of low-income countries to tax effectively, prevent them from progressively allocating the tax burden. Progressive property and other wealth taxes are difficult to implement for political reasons (Ahmad and Stern 1989, p. 1017, Moore 2013; whereas progressive income and capital gains taxes are relatively easy to avoid or evade (Bird and Zolt 2005, p. 933). Instead, low-income countries must predominantly rely on indirect taxes such as value-added or sales taxes, which generally have a regressive effect on income equality (Ahmad andStern 1989, p. 1021).…”

Section: Fiscal Self-determination and Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

BEPS, tax sovereignty and global justice

Apeldoorn

2016

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

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The base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and G20 countries marks an important development in the reform of the international taxation regime. In this paper I argue that the initiative nevertheless fails to provide a coherent account of what global justice requires in the realm of fiscal policy. While the OECD's ostensible aim to increase and protect the tax sovereignty of states is commendable, there is insufficient attention for the distribution of relative tax sovereignty. I show that current global income inequality is correlated with significant inequality of tax sovereignty, that this inequality is unjust on a plausible conception of what global justice requires, and that the BEPS initiative is unlikely to meaningfully address this injustice. I close by suggesting that an internationalist conception of justice concerned with securing the tax sovereignty of independent polities may need to prescribe the creation of globally redistributive institutions.

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Chapter 20 Taxation for developing countries

Cited by 34 publications

References 55 publications

Why Do Poor democracies Collect a Lot of Tariff Revenue?

Why Do Poor democracies Collect a Lot of Tariff Revenue?

Land Prices and Housing in Manila

BEPS, tax sovereignty and global justice

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