Chapter 15 Job search and labor market analysis

Mortensen, Dale T.

doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(86)02005-9

Cited by 764 publications

(535 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…The model is a familiar one in the literature (e.g. see Barron and Mellow, 1979;Mortensen, 1986) There is a distribution of wage offers f(w) that arrive at a certain rate, ( ) …”

Section: A Simple Model Of Search Activitymentioning

confidence: 99%

You can't always get what you want: The impact of the UK Jobseeker's Allowance

Manning

2009

Labour Economics

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In 1996 the UK made major changes to its welfare system for the support of the unemployed with the introduction of the Jobseeker's Allowance. This tightened the work search requirements needed for eligibility for benefit. It resulted in large flows out of claimant status, but, this paper concludes, not into employment. The movement out of claimant status was largest for those with low levels of search activity. But, this paper finds no evidence of increased job search activity as a result of this change.

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“…The model is a familiar one in the literature (e.g. see Barron and Mellow, 1979;Mortensen, 1986) There is a distribution of wage offers f(w) that arrive at a certain rate, ( ) …”

Section: A Simple Model Of Search Activitymentioning

confidence: 99%

You can't always get what you want: The impact of the UK Jobseeker's Allowance

Manning

2009

Labour Economics

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“…The SmallCollege coefficient being close to zero and not statistically significant suggests that the uncertainty associated with a player's ability is not an important consideration when a team drafts a player. 31 The search literature suggests that the effect of the variance of player's ability level on draft selection should depend on where the distribution is truncated (see Mortensen, 1986, for a review of the search literature; Hendricks et al, 2003, consider the effect of uncertainty on the NFL hiring process). The location of the truncation varies significantly across selection number.…”

Section: Uncertainty Associated With Player's Abilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Discrimination in Hiring Versus Retention and Promotion: An Empirical Analysis of Within-Firm Treatment of Players in the NFL

Conlin

2005

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

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If the costs and benefits of discriminating at the hiring stage differ from those at the retention and promotion stages, as recent evidence suggests, the effect of an individual's race on a firm's hiring decision should differ from its effect on the firm's retention and promotion decisions. This paper presents the first direct empirical test of this proposition. Using data of players drafted into the National Football League (NFL), we show that after controlling for draft selection, position, team, draft year, collegiate division, and team wins the prior season, white players have a 0.13 lower probability of having an active contract and start 1.56 games less than nonwhite players. When compared with the average probability of a drafted player having an active contract, 0.48, and the average number of starts, 2.6 games, these results provide strong evidence that nonwhite players face hiring discrimination in the NFL but are treated more equitably in retention and promotion decisions.

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“…The work on search and matching by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1986), andPissarides (1985) underpins the process by which producers and retailers find one another. Our model is formulated in continuous time and we focus on steady-state implications, thereby ignoring any transition dynamics.…”

Section: Searching For Business Affiliates 21 Model Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Goods-Market Frictions and International Trade

Krolikowski

McCallum²

2016

Working Paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland)

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We present a tractable framework that embeds goods-market frictions in a general equilibrium dynamic model with heterogeneous exporters and identical importers. These frictions arise because it takes time and expense for exporters and importers to meet. We show that search frictions lead to an endogenous fraction of unmatched exporters, alter the gains from trade, endogenize entry costs, and imply that the competitive equilibrium does not generally result in the socially optimal number of searching fi rms. Finally, ignoring search frictions results in biased estimates of the effect of tariffs on trade fl ows.

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Chapter 15 Job search and labor market analysis

Cited by 764 publications

References 49 publications

You can't always get what you want: The impact of the UK Jobseeker's Allowance

You can't always get what you want: The impact of the UK Jobseeker's Allowance

Discrimination in Hiring Versus Retention and Promotion: An Empirical Analysis of Within-Firm Treatment of Players in the NFL

Goods-Market Frictions and International Trade

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