Changing patterns of party unity in the Knesset: The consequences of the Israeli anti-defection law

Abstract

This article explores the consequences of the Israeli anti-defection law for the rate and timing of party switching in the Knesset. Its central finding is that while the anti-defection law has failed to act as a strong deterrent against party exits and defections, it (i) moved defections to the immediate pre-electoral period and (ii) encouraged collective party switching via the formation of new party groups as opposed to solo defections. While these effects can be directly attributed to the incentives that are generated by the legislation, the Israeli case holds an important implication for the comparative study of anti-defection laws: such laws may not improve legislative party unity if there are other institutions, such as the electoral system and candidate selection practices, that have a countervailing effect and incentivize party exit.

Party Switching in Israel: Understanding the Split of the Labor Party in 2011

“…The origins of the Israeli anti-defection law can be traced to the events that culminated in the collapse of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s National Unity government in March 1990 (Nikolenyi, 2019; Nikolenyi & Shenhav, 2015). Given that defectors played a central role in this drama, which paralyzed the Israeli political system for months, and that a massive public outcry subsequently demanded that the political establishment pass political reforms to clean up the country’s political institutions, the Knesset adopted the anti-defection law to impose penalties on prospective defectors unless their party switching met certain carefully designed criteria.…”

“…Once again, however, recognized splits constituted the exception; according to the new legislation, the factions that resulted from a party split would divide among themselves the amount of state funding that had accrued to the original faction according to the new number of their respective MKs. Although several aspects of these legislative amendments have changed over time, the key provisions about the size of a legally permissible defection (the 1/3 rule) and its timing (90 days before the next election) have remained stable (Nikolenyi, 2019).…”

“…Yet, in spite of the growing interest in anti-defection rules, very few studies have investigated their effects. Some exceptions include works that look at how antidefection laws shape the fragmentation of legislative party systems (Nikolenyi, 2014;Subramanian, 2008); how they affect the level and practice of corruption (Yadav, 2012); and how they change legislators' ability to engage in parliamentary debate and dissent (Khanna & Shah, 2012;Leston-Bandeira, 2009). This lack of scholarly attention to studying what anti-defection laws are meant to achieve, namely to compel and sanction legislative party unity, is unfortunate because the application of such laws can actually help us re-evaluate some existing claims about party cohesion and party unity.…”

“…Although several aspects of these legislative amendments have changed over time, the key provisions about the size of a legally permissible defection (the 1/3 rule) and its timing (90 days before the next election) have remained stable (Nikolenyi, 2019).…”

“…In the aftermath of the infamous "stinking trick" and the ensuing wave of legislative defections that brought down Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's National Unity government in 1990, the Knesset passed a new piece of legislation to regulate the inter-party mobility of its Members (MKs) in the future. Since its inception, the anti-defection law has failed to bring down the frequency of party switching in subsequent Israeli legislatures (Nikolenyi 2019). A prime example of the inefficiency of the anti-defection law could be seen in the 18th Knesset (2009Knesset ( -2013, which suffered a particularly high number of switches.…”