Changing Conspiracy Beliefs through Rationality and Ridiculing

Abstract

Conspiracy theory (CT) beliefs can be harmful. How is it possible to reduce them effectively? Three reduction strategies were tested in an online experiment using general and well-known CT beliefs on a comprehensive randomly assigned Hungarian sample (N = 813): exposing rational counter CT arguments, ridiculing those who hold CT beliefs, and empathizing with the targets of CT beliefs. Several relevant individual differences were measured. Rational and ridiculing arguments were effective in reducing CT, whereas empathizing with the targets of CTs had no effect. Individual differences played no role in CT reduction, but the perceived intelligence and competence of the individual who conveyed the CT belief-reduction information contributed to the success of the CT belief reduction. Rational arguments targeting the link between the object of belief and its characteristics appear to be an effective tool in fighting conspiracy theory beliefs.

Stigmatized beliefs: Conspiracy theories, anticipated negative evaluation of the self, and fear of social exclusion

“…Our contribution shows that people consider conspiracy theories as a social cost. As it turns out that ridiculing arguments of those who believe in conspiracy theories is effective to reduce belief in conspiracy theories (Orosz et al., ), the challenge is to ensure, at the same time, that we avoid contributing to this stigma. Hence, interventions aimed at addressing this important societal phenomenon should take into account this aspect.…”

“…In addition to being qualified as possessing such flaws, conspiracy believers are often considered in the collective imagination as suffering from mental health disorders, such as paranoia (Bratich, ; Harambam & Aupers, , ; Husting & Orr, ; Sparkman, ). Moreover, ridiculing arguments of those who believe in conspiracy theories has been found to be an effective lever to reduce belief in conspiracy theories (Orosz et al., ). In sum, social views of conspiracy (e.g., theories, beliefs, believers, etc.)…”

Understanding Conspiracy Theories

“…Jolley and Douglas () showed that presenting counterconspiracy information before conspiracy information—in other words “inoculating” people against conspiracy theories—can reduce belief. Orosz, Krekó, Paskuj, Tóth‐Király, Bothe, and Roland‐Lévy () showed that counterarguing and even ridiculing conspiracy claims could be effective in reducing conspiracy belief. In future efforts, researchers may consider some of the techniques used to address misinformation more generally (e.g., counterarguing, retraction, prewarning; see Flynn et al, for an overview).…”

Psychometric assessment of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale

“…The study additionally incorporated self-reflectiveness (i.e., willingness to acknowledge the possibility of being incorrect). Researchers have not previously examined this in relation to belief in conspiracies [43], however believers in conspiracy theories typically resist alternative arguments, particularly of a rational nature [45]. Self-certainty and self-reflectiveness represent facets of cognitive insight, which can be conceptualised as the mental processes involved in self re-evaluation of anomalous experiences and misunderstandings [46][47]).…”