Changes in Public Service Bargains: Ministers and Civil Servants in Denmark

Abstract

The concept of public service bargain (PSB) has been reintroduced in recent times to the study of public administration to analyse the division of roles between ministers and the civil service in the context of public service reforms (Hood 2000, 2001, 2002; Hood and Lodge 2006). The empirical investigation of the concept of PSB in general and changes in PSBs in particular is, however, limited. This article addresses this limitation by investigating what causes changes in public service bargains, particularly with respect to the provision of advice. As argued by Hood, we demonstrate how changes in PSBs can be explained by a combination of changes in the environments of ministries as well as the interests of the political actors. Furthermore, we point to the professional qualifications of civil servants as well as their interests as causes of change which, until now, have not received sufficient attention in the PSB literature. The article is based on a longitudinal case study of PSB between ministers and the permanent civil service in Denmark.

Achilles' heels of governance: Critical capacity deficits and their role in governance failures

“…At the organizational level, factors such as the existence of a good working relationship or “public service bargain” between ministers and the public service are central to “ organizational political capacity ” and effective governance (Hood ; Hondeghem ; Salomonsen & Knudsen ). In principle, the ministers are usually in charge of policy and the bureaucracy in charge of administration, although there is often no such clear distinction between the two roles in practice.…”

Conflict between Explicit and Tacit Public Service Bargains in U.K. Executive Agencies

“…The terms of PSBs can also be ambiguous, which can be used strategically by bargaining actors (Burns, Wei, and Peters ). But ambiguity should diminish when PSBs are formalized in contracts or legislation (Salomonsen and Knudsen ; Van der Meer, Van den Berg, and Dijkstra ). Finally, there is some evidence that stated and practiced PSBs can be inconsistent.…”

“…Various terms have been used to describe the epistemological dualism with which this article is concerned, including “explicit–tacit,” “formal–informal,” “written‐unwritten,” and “law–convention.” Each describes how the PSB extends beyond its prima facie representation. In other words, the deal is “constituted by formal and informal components” (Bezes and Lodge , 143), so that “regardless [of] the degree of formalization, there is always a highly… informal aspect of bargains” (Salomonsen and Knudsen , 1020).…”

“…Although the manner and strength of this interdependence varies between contexts, it results in patterns of deal making that are widespread (Hood and Lodge ). This makes PSBs a useful basis for longitudinal and cross‐national comparisons of civil service systems and public management reforms (Burns, Wei, and Peters ; Salomonsen and Knudsen ; Van der Meer, Van den Berg, and Dijkstra ).…”

Politicians, political advisers and the vocabulary of public service bargains: Speaking in tongues?

“…One aim of these rules‐of‐the‐game is a state of organizational equilibrium in which the incentives offered to and the contributions made by parties to a bargain are in balance. The specifics of a balanced bargain will reflect the interplay between parties’ interests and the institutional context in which it is negotiated (Salomonsen and Knudsen ). Public service bargains are, in short, creatures of time and place (Lodge ) and come in various shapes and sizes, although they can generally be distinguished on three bases: reward (what is offered), competence (the nature of the services rendered), and loyalty and responsibility (which includes considerations of cheating and punishment) (Hood and Lodge ).…”