Change, time, and place

Trifogli, Cecilia

doi:10.1017/cho9781107446953.024

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 4 publications

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“…23 See Coope 2009. On subsequent scholastic developments of this idea, see Maier 1982, 21-39, andTrifogli 2010. 24 This is compatible with the fact that some mediaeval Aristotelians connected permanence to the possibility of momentary existence (Pasnau 2011, 378).…”

Section: Time Change and Powermentioning

confidence: 81%

Force, Motion, and Leibniz’s Argument from Successiveness

Myrdal

2021

Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie

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This essay proposes a new interpretation of a central, and yet overlooked, argument Leibniz offers against Descartes’s power-free ontology of the corporeal world. Appealing to considerations about the successiveness of motion, Leibniz attempts to show that the reality of motion requires force. It is often assumed that the argument is driven by concerns inspired by Zeno. Against such a reading, this essay contends that Leibniz’s argument is instead best understood against the background of an Aristotelian view of the priority of real being over time. The essay also shows how this alternative interpretation can help to shed new light on the difference between Leibnizian forces and Aristotelian powers, as well as on Leibniz’s famous claim that accounting for force leads us beyond the mechanistic corporeal realm.

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Section: Time Change and Powermentioning

confidence: 81%

Force, Motion, and Leibniz’s Argument from Successiveness

Myrdal

2021

Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie

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¿Cómo podemos tener percepciones más o menos claras de un objeto? Guillermo de Ockham y Walter Chatton sobre la mayor o menor perfección de los actos mentales

Gamboa

2015

Tópicos

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During the fourteenth century there were two main theories concerning the intension and remission of qualities, understood as accidental forms. The supporters of the first theory considered that a quality increases or decreases due to the addition or subtraction of its own parts, whereas the defenders of the second one considered that a quality increases or decreases due to the successive substitution of a previous form with a new one. Ockham advocated the first account regarding mental states understood as qualities. Chatton advocated in his first writings both theories but, in his mature writings, he defended only the second one. Ockham and Chatton's theories are based on different views concerning the nature of change. In addition, both theories involve different mechanisms regulating the greater or lesser perfection of a mental state.Key words: William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, mental states, intension and remission, philosophy of mind. ResumenEn el siglo XIV se propusieron dos teorías principales para explicar el aumento y la reducción de las cualidades, entendidas éstas como formas accidentales. Quienes defendían alguna de estas dos teorías sostenían que una cualidad aumenta o se reduce Recibido: 24 -04 -2015. Aceptado: 05 -06 -2015

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Change, time, and place

Cited by 2 publications

References 4 publications

Force, Motion, and Leibniz’s Argument from Successiveness

Force, Motion, and Leibniz’s Argument from Successiveness

¿Cómo podemos tener percepciones más o menos claras de un objeto? Guillermo de Ockham y Walter Chatton sobre la mayor o menor perfección de los actos mentales

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