Change of ownership networks in Japan

Abstract

Summary. As complex networks in economics, we consider Japanese shareholding networks as they existed in 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002, and 2003. In this study, we use as data lists of shareholders for companies listed on the stock market or on the over-the-counter market. The lengths of the shareholder lists vary with the companies, and we use lists for the top 20 shareholders. We represent these shareholding networks as a directed graph by drawing arrows from shareholders to stock corporations. Consequently, the distribution of incoming edges has an upper bound, while that of outgoing edges has no bound. This representation shows that for all years the distributions of outgoing degrees can be well explained by the power law function with an exponential tail. The exponent depends on the year and the country, while the power law shape is maintained universally. We show that the exponent strongly correlates with the long-term shareholding rate and the cross-shareholding rate.

Corporate payments networks and credit risk rating

“…Even if we cannot directly compare the topological properties of our network with other similar ones, we can take as point of comparison other firm-to-firm networks commonly used in the literature. The corporate control/ownership networks display typically some similarity with ours, for example sparsity [8,10], a power law degree distribution [7,10] with the presence of hubs [10], small diameter [6], and bow tie structure [8].…”

“…Previous works on networks of firms focussed mainly on ownership relations [6][7][8][9][10], or dealt with the theoretical modelling of other types of relation [11]. Exceptions are the empirical studies on the Japanese economic firm-to-firm network [12,13], where links represent buyer-supplier relationship.…”

Network Structure of Japanese Firms - Scale-Free, Hierarchy, and Degree Correlation: Analysis from 800,000 Firms

“…We discover the hierarchy by analyzing the clustering coefficient. We also discover that an undirected network has scale-free degree distribution Garlaschelli et al (2005), Souma et al (2006) studied the existing shareholders' network in Japan, Italy, and the US and found that this network contained scale-free network structures. However, their data comprised only a small number of firms.…”

Do larger firms have more interfirm relationships?

“…Interfirm networks have been investigated by several papers [1,2,4,5]. In particular, shareholding networks have been examined for those firms listed in the United States, Japan, and Italy [2,5], to find that these networks have scale-free characteristics, and that indegree exhibits power-law distributions.…”

“…In particular, shareholding networks have been examined for those firms listed in the United States, Japan, and Italy [2,5], to find that these networks have scale-free characteristics, and that indegree exhibits power-law distributions. But these existing studies have only looked at a small subset of firms, typically listed firms or firms in a specific industry or region.…”