Chance and uncertainty in<i>On War</i>

Herbig, Katherine L.

doi:10.1080/01402398608437260

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Thus uncertainty is viewed above all instrumentally, as a problem for the conduct of operations and (to use a more contemporary formulation) a potential ''effect'' to be inflicted on the enemy. On the other hand, it is a text that recognizes uncertainty itself as that which is most enduring, most certain in war (Herbig 1989). As Clausewitz reminds both soldiers and theorists ''who aim at fixed values,'' in war ''everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities' ' (1976:136).…”

Section: ''Beings Cast In Motion'': Fighting Polity and Societymentioning

confidence: 99%

Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and Critique1

Barkawi

Brighton

2011

International Political Sociology

113

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This paper approaches the ontology of war by asking why, despite its constitutive function for politics and society, has war never been made the object of an academic discipline? Through an analysis of the relationship between war and knowledge about war, we argue that the ontology of war is such that it disrupts foundational claims of the kind necessary for conventional forms of academic disciplinarity. At the center of the ontology of war is fighting, an idea we recover from Clausewitz. A moment of radical contingency, fighting both compromises knowledge about war and forces the unmaking and remaking of social and political orders. These generative powers of war operate through the production of systems of knowledge and their institutionalization in the academy, the state and wider society. Although of existential significance for political authority, these knowledges are vulnerable to the very contingency of war that produces them. This complex of relations between war, knowledge, and power we term War/Truth. As such, an analytical framework adequate to war requires a reflexive relation to truth claims. We clear the ground for such a “critical war studies.”

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Section: ''Beings Cast In Motion'': Fighting Polity and Societymentioning

confidence: 99%

Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and Critique1

Barkawi

Brighton

2011

International Political Sociology

113

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“…Here ρ is the mean level of the exchange ratio, σ > 0 is the volatility of the process, λ is the speed of mean reversion, and the variables X are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) normal distributed random variables where X n ∼ N (0, 1). In our model, we interpret the stochastic nature exchange ratio as modelling the different engagements and strategies by either side that result in deviations from the historic exchange ratio and the general uncertainty in warfare commonly refered to as the "Fog of War" [Clausewitz and Maude, 1982;Herbig, 1986;Waldman, 2010].…”

Section: The Stochastic Combat Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The mean exchange ratio ρ and the initial value of the mean exchange ratio ρ 0 of attackers lost to defenders is taken to be the historical value of 1.5 as defenders are generally considered to be more effective in combat Epstein [1985]. The value of σ = 0.2 accounts for the size of the variations in the exchange ratio that result as a consequence of the uncertainty of warfare [Clausewitz and Maude, 1982;Herbig, 1986;Waldman, 2010] and the evolving strategies by either side. The value of λ = 0.2 accounts for the speed at which the exchange ratio returns to its historical value (ρ = 1.5) in the event of deviations from its mean.…”

Section: Numerical Simulations Of the Combat Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Stochastic processes in a discrete model of ground combat

2019

El Sawah, S. (Ed.) MODSIM2019, 23rd International Congress on Modelling and Simulation.

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Discrete models of combat are a rare part of the combat modelling literature. Our work introduces a stochastic version of a discrete ground combat based on Epstein theory featuring two adversarial sides, namely an attacker and a defender. Noticeably, the Epstein model of ground combat features an evolving battle front through a withdrawal mechanism to capture the connection between attrition and movement of the front historically prevalent in ground war. Our extension from the deterministic setting of the Epstein model to the stochastic setting is achieved by taking the exchange ratio of attackers lost to defenders to be a mean-reverting stochastic process. The extension of the exchange ratio to a stochastic process is interrupted to be the result of changing strategies and engagements by either side as well of the generally uncertainty of warfare known as the "Fog of War" upon the outcome of combat. In the deterministic setting of our model, our toy numerical example results in an attacker victory. In the extension of the exchange ratio to a stochastic process, the attackers are no longer assured victory. However, the variations in the exchange ratio can be of benefit to the attackers in that they may achieve victory in a shorter combat duration and as a consequence suffer less attrition. Thus we interpret the stochastic process as introducing a "risk vs reward" scenario for the attackers where the risk is quantified through the volatility of the process. Our numerical simulations explore the shift in the outcome of combat for the attackers as they take on additional risk and more uncertainty is introduced into combat. We observe the probability that the attacker is victorious, the time till victory when the attacker is victorious, and the remaining ground force strength of the attacking forces for varying volatility. Our results show that for increasing values of the volatility of the exchange ratio process, the probability of an attacker victory increases but the combat duration decreases and the remaining combat power of the attacker forces increases.

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“…Herbig, 1989). Clausewitz was not only the theorist of war as historically contingent but also of war as uncertainty (see e.g.…”

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confidence: 99%