Challenging Executive Dominance in<scp>E</scp>uropean Democracy

Curtin, Deirdre

doi:10.1111/1468-2230.12054

Cited by 115 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 88 publications

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“…Reflecting a global "rise of the unelected", the EU can be depicted as a fore-runner of expert governance (Curtin, 2014;Vibert, 2007). Next to comitology committees and other forms of network governance for expert advice (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008), the European decision makers rely on the expert advice of so-called European Regulatory Agencies (ERAs).…”

Section: Regulation By Information: Autonomy and Expertise Of Erasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Driven by Expertise and Insulation? The Autonomy of European Regulatory Agencies

Ossege¹

2015

PaG

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Expertise and autonomy are cornerstones to the effective operation and legitimacy of European Regulatory Agencies (ERAs). Yet, we know little about ERAs' actual autonomy, nor about factors shaping it. This article studies ERAs' actual autonomy from public and private actors, emphasising two crucial explanatory factors: expertise and rulemaking competences. The lack of insights on expertise is particularly striking, as expertise-the "raison d'être" and main resource of expert bodies-provides ERAs with a potentially powerful means to increase autonomy. Relying on a rational institutionalist framework within which ERAs enjoy substantive discretion to pursue their goals, the study empirically compares three powerful ERAs-the European Medicines Agency, the European Chemicals Agency, and the European Food Safety Authority. Based on the analysis of 39 semi-structured expert interviews, findings show that expertise is a crucial explanation for ERAs' substantive autonomy from the Commission. Towards research intensive private stakeholders, the role of expertise becomes less pronounced. Instead, ERAs are more successful in protecting their autonomy by engaging in the risk-averse interpretation of the regulatory framework and by adapting rules over time to adapt their needs: they engage in "procedural insulation". Political salience provides a scope condition for ERAs to use expert knowledge and rulemaking competences more strategically-potentially undermining scientific quality.

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Section: Regulation By Information: Autonomy and Expertise Of Erasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Driven by Expertise and Insulation? The Autonomy of European Regulatory Agencies

Ossege¹

2015

PaG

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“…The literature so far has focused on questions related to accountability within the mechanism (Cooper 2017;Crum 2017, Crum andCurtin 2015;Curtin 2014;Cygan, 2017;Dawson 2015;Lord 2017;Scharpf 2012; as well as the adaptation of national parliaments (NPs) to the European Semester (Crum 2017;Fasone 2013;Hallerberg, Marzinotto and Wolff, 2011;Jančić 2016;Kreilinger 2016). However, one aspect of the European Semester, namely the effectiveness of the mechanism, has received significantly less academic attention (Kreilinger 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effectiveness of the European Semester: Explaining Domestic Consent and Contestation

Maatsch

2017

Parliamentary Affairs

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MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowledge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of charge (PDF). (2014 and 2015) in Austria, France, Germany, and Ireland. While in France and Germany, compliance within the European Semester has been subject to strong politicization, this has not been the case in Austria and Ireland. Moreover, strong politicization coincided with the contestation of country-specific recommendations among the parliamentary parties. The empirical analysis established that strong formal powers in budgetary matters constitute an important prerequisite allowing parliamentary parties to articulate their contestation. However, the willingness to comply depends most directly on whether the content of country-specific recommendations is coherent with the economic preferences of a political party, not the government-opposition cleavage. Keywords

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“…Literature on transparency in the EU has predominantly portrayed the Commission and the Council of Ministers (henceforth Council)-and more recently the European Council-as reluctant to provide the requested information out of concern for 'space to think' and efficiency of the decision-making process (Curtin, 2014;Hillebrandt & Novak, 2016). The focus has predominantly been on Council proceedings, driven by the reforms introduced by Regulation 1049/2001 on access to documents and a perceived power shift towards the Council and the European Council in EU politics (Curtin, 2014).…”

Section: State Of the Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The focus has predominantly been on Council proceedings, driven by the reforms introduced by Regulation 1049/2001 on access to documents and a perceived power shift towards the Council and the European Council in EU politics (Curtin, 2014). Several studies have analysed the institutional drivers of Council transparency policies (Bjurulf & Elgström, 2004;Hillebrandt, Curtin, & Meijer, 2014).…”

Section: State Of the Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Access to Documents to Consumption of Information: The European Commission Transparency Policy for the TTIP Negotiations

Coremans

2017

PaG

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To increase transparency of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, the European Commission has reformed existing information sharing systems for trade policy. The Commission has moved from a strategy of providing transparency in the form of access to documents to one of access to information, geared specifically towards enhancing consumption of the available information. In both public and institutional transparency policy, the width of the target audience and the depth of the information have increased, and the manner of provision has shifted from reactive to proactive provision of information. As a result, the TTIP is now being coined as the most transparent trade negotiation ever in the EU's history and a pilot project for transparency policy in future trade negotiations. The article adopts a supplycentred perspective to explain a transparency policy that goes beyond the legal minimum imposed by formal requirements. It relies on interview data of the changes brought about in inter-institutional relations since 2014, basic quantitative and qualitative analysis of document material, and a five-month participatory observation by the author in the secretariat of the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade.

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Challenging Executive Dominance inEuropean Democracy

Cited by 115 publications

References 88 publications

Driven by Expertise and Insulation? The Autonomy of European Regulatory Agencies

Driven by Expertise and Insulation? The Autonomy of European Regulatory Agencies

Effectiveness of the European Semester: Explaining Domestic Consent and Contestation

From Access to Documents to Consumption of Information: The European Commission Transparency Policy for the TTIP Negotiations

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