Challenging corruption and clientelism in post-conflict and developing states

Singh, Danny

doi:10.1007/s10611-018-9807-6

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…This, in turn, is more difficult to tax than revenues obtained from free resources. Foreign aid, which falls under free resources, can play a particularly dubious role in that regard since it allows dictators to continue practices of co-optation and repression [69] while simultaneously decreasing their financial dependency on wellfunctioning economic structures ( [16], p. 180). As North et al [57] emphasize, the societal structure of LAOs that is based on privileges limits economic growth by fostering monopolies and rents.…”

Section: Strategies To Deal With the Threat From The Masses: Appeasing Or Repressingmentioning

confidence: 99%

To appease or to repress: how dictators use economic dynamics to increase their regime longevity

Harrijvan¹,

Weerdesteijn²

2020

Crime Law Soc Change

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International crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, are more likely to occur in non-democratic regimes. Consequently, the decision-making process of dictators has increasingly garnered criminological interest [78]. The decisions dictators make and the strategies they use impact the longevity of their regime. Scholars predominantly focus on the extent to which a dictator is able to generate support from both the elite and the masses in explaining regime survival [3, 22, 54]. A dictator can use economic dynamics to increase his support among the elite through corrupt practices [3], he can determine the extent to which he is supported by the masses by offering public goods and services to them [22] and he can withhold benefits to repress threats stemming from these groups [17]. However, the intentional use of these strategies to increase regime survival remains under-researched [77]. The present research aims to fill this gap through an analysis of Paul Biya’s 37-year reign in Cameroon. It is argued that the economic structure of a country influences the strategy—repression or appeasement—that is chosen to deal with the threat stemming from the masses or the elite and that ultimately, these considerations are likely to influence the economic development of a country.

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Section: Strategies To Deal With the Threat From The Masses: Appeasing Or Repressingmentioning

confidence: 99%

To appease or to repress: how dictators use economic dynamics to increase their regime longevity

Harrijvan¹,

Weerdesteijn²

2020

Crime Law Soc Change

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“…The effective control of corruption demands the development and fortification of institutions such as anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement, and the judiciary (Singh, 2019). Policymakers and practitioners can identify methods to strengthen these institutions and enhance their efficacy by studying the factors that impact corruption control (Farah , 2021 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Factors Affecting Corruption Control in Public Administration: Evidence from Vietnam

Hoa,

Thanh

2023

J. of Law and Sust. Develop.

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Objective: This study aims to enhance the current body of knowledge on corruption prevention in Vietnam, which predominantly relies on qualitative research. The objective is to augment this understanding by conducting quantitative research. We investigate the influence of five key factors - institutional, cultural, political, economic, and personal - on individuals' confidence in the government's ability to combat corruption in public administration in Vietnam. Methods: To achieve our objective, we employed a purposeful sampling method, involving a study sample size of 200 participants. A multivariable linear regression model was used to examine our research hypothesis. Results: Our findings reveal that all five factors, namely institutional, cultural, political, economic, and personal, have a positive and statistically significant impact on the control of corruption within Vietnam's public administration. Notably, the political factor exerts the most substantial influence. Suggestions: The implications of our results underscore the importance of instituting institutional reforms that prioritize transparency, accountability, and the promotion of good governance practices. Such measures are vital for fostering public trust and confidence in the government's capacity to prevent and combat corruption within Vietnam's public administration system.

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“…Na captura do Estado, agentes privados agem para manipular as decisões das instituições governamentais para que sirvam a seus interesses (Singh, 2019). Hellman & Kaufmann (2001) afirmam que a captura do Estado é uma forma de corrupção em grande escala reconhecida como o problema mais pernicioso e difícil de detectar nas economias políticas e nas reformas institucionais e econômicas.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Risco de captura por assimetria de informação na Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis

Azevedo¹,

Moreira²

2021

CGPC

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Entre os estudos para combate à corrupção, destaca-se a linha dos que discutem regulação como resultado da alteração no papel do Estado de executor para regulador de serviços públicos. Nesse cenário, as agências reguladoras são atores destinados a equilibrar as forças de mercado para garantir a prestação desses serviços. Em mercados imperfeitos e sujeitos a falhas, os agentes econômicos podem adquirir informações privilegiadas e tentar capturar os órgãos reguladores, o que se configuraria como uma nova forma de corrupção. Embora haja consolidação do risco de captura no campo teórico, registra-se a ausência de pesquisas empíricas que testem a manifestação do fenômeno. Neste estudo, desenvolve-se pesquisa empírica aplicada a uma agência reguladora nacional para verificar seu risco de captura por assimetria de informação entre o órgão regulador e os respectivos agentes do mercado regulado. Os resultados demonstram que o risco de captura por assimetria de informação pode ser analisado à luz de nove categorias: esforço, diversificação, internacionalização, seleção adversa, risco moral, sinalização, porte da empresa, qualidade e transversalidade.

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Challenging corruption and clientelism in post-conflict and developing states

Cited by 6 publications

References 14 publications

To appease or to repress: how dictators use economic dynamics to increase their regime longevity

To appease or to repress: how dictators use economic dynamics to increase their regime longevity

Factors Affecting Corruption Control in Public Administration: Evidence from Vietnam

Risco de captura por assimetria de informação na Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis

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