2007
DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jbr.2350059
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Challenges in implementing capital adequacy guidelines to Islamic banks

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Cited by 51 publications
(34 citation statements)
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“…On the one hand, under Islamic banking principles a number of depositors supply investment accounts and participate in the bank investment activities through risk-sharing schemes, thus, in principle, requiring less protection than conventional bank depositors (Ariss and Sarieddine, 2007). On the other hand, the possibility of shifting risks on depositors raises the risk of moral hazard, so that all investors should look for a higher degree of safekeeping.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the one hand, under Islamic banking principles a number of depositors supply investment accounts and participate in the bank investment activities through risk-sharing schemes, thus, in principle, requiring less protection than conventional bank depositors (Ariss and Sarieddine, 2007). On the other hand, the possibility of shifting risks on depositors raises the risk of moral hazard, so that all investors should look for a higher degree of safekeeping.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With regard to the literature on Islamic banking, some theoretical research studies (e.g., Ariss & Sarieddine, ; Karim, ) argue capital adequacy requirements may be irrelevant to Islamic banks, proposing other methods to calculate the adequate capital. Others (e.g., Errico & Farahbaksh, ; Hassan & Dicle, ) demonstrate Islamic banks can follow the international standards that apply to conventional banks.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…He concludes regulatory authorities would have to use an adjusted framework in addition to that of Basle to deal with the specificity of PSIAs. Ariss and Sarieddine () show the Pillar I of the Basel II Accord may be not relevant to Islamic banks because their depositors participate in the bank investment activities through risk‐sharing schemes. They recommend a new regulatory body for Islamic banks should take into account the Sharia compliance risk because Islamic financing and investing activities differ across Islamic financial institutions or across countries.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But these standards are still at evolutionary stage as Muljawan, Dar, and Hall (2004) have critically evaluated the capital adequacy frame work defined by AAOIFI for IFI and raised some serious issues on established standards, they also proposed new frame after analysing the criticism of proposed framework. Ariss and Sarieddine (2007) studied the implications of Pillar 1 of the Basel II accord to Islamic banks following the IFSB and the AAOIFI guidelines, and recommended proposals for developing a capital adequacy framework that better accounts for Islamic banks activities. Similarly Archer, Karim and Sundararajan (2010) established a quantitative analytical framework for the exercise of supervisory discretion on "alpha" to assess the adequacy of Islamic banks capital.…”
Section: Regulatory Capital Requirementmentioning
confidence: 99%