Challenges and lessons learned from commissioning an IEC 61850-90-5 based synchrophasor system

Madani, Vahid; Picard, Stephan D.; Yin, Yujie; Adamiak, Mark

doi:10.1109/cpre.2015.7102208

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Similarly, IEC 61850-90-5 originally evolved from IEC 61850 in 2012. Authors in [8] explained the evolution of IEC 61850-90-5 and addressed challenges in its commissioning.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 synchrophasor communication frameworks

Khan

McLaughlin

Laverty

et al. 2016

2016 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM)

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“…Similarly, IEC 61850-90-5 originally evolved from IEC 61850 in 2012. Authors in [8] explained the evolution of IEC 61850-90-5 and addressed challenges in its commissioning.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 synchrophasor communication frameworks

Khan

McLaughlin

Laverty

et al. 2016

2016 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM)

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“…IEC recently established a working group for development of a synchrophasor standard. The group developed the IEC 61850-90-5 standard and also proposed a security mechanism (Madani et al (2015) ). Allgood et al (2011) highlighted that synchrophasors are transmitted over widearea networks and an insecure communication protocol raises serious threats against potential cyber attacks.…”

Section: Synchrophasor Technologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Threat Analysis of BlackEnergy Malware for Synchrophasor based Real-time Control and Monitoring in Smart Grid

Khan

Maynard

McLaughlin

et al. 2016

Electronic Workshops in Computing

116

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The BlackEnergy malware targeting critical infrastructures has a long history. It evolved over time from a simple DDoS platform to a quite sophisticated plug-in based malware. The plug-in architecture has a persistent malware core with easily installable attack specific modules for DDoS, spamming, info-stealing, remote access, boot-sector formatting etc. BlackEnergy has been involved in several high profile cyber physical attacks including the recent Ukraine power grid attack in December 2015. This paper investigates the evolution of BlackEnergy and its cyber attack capabilities. It presents a basic cyber attack model used by BlackEnergy for targeting industrial control systems. In particular, the paper analyzes cyber threats of BlackEnergy for synchrophasor based systems which are used for real-time control and monitoring functionalities in smart grid. Several BlackEnergy based attack scenarios have been investigated by exploiting the vulnerabilities in two widely used synchrophasor communication standards: (i) IEEE C37.118 and (ii) IEC 61850-90-5. Specifically, the paper addresses reconnaissance, DDoS, man-in-the-middle and replay/reflection attacks on IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5. Further, the paper also investigates protection strategies for detection and prevention of BlackEnergy based cyber physical attacks.

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A Review on Applications of the Standard SeriesIEC61850 in Smart Grid Applications

Himri¹,

Muyeen²,

Malik³

et al. 2021

Cyberphysical Smart Cities Infrastructures

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Challenges and lessons learned from commissioning an IEC 61850-90-5 based synchrophasor system

Cited by 5 publications

References 3 publications

Analysis of IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 synchrophasor communication frameworks

Analysis of IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 synchrophasor communication frameworks

Threat Analysis of BlackEnergy Malware for Synchrophasor based Real-time Control and Monitoring in Smart Grid

A Review on Applications of the Standard SeriesIEC61850 in Smart Grid Applications

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