Ch‐ch‐ch‐changes: Artists Talk About Teaching by John Reardon

Williamson, Beth

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8357.2010.01115_11.x

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…The many reasons include: (a) its generalization to the rest of languageinferential role semanticshas proved problematic; (b) inferentialism does not mesh with the generally semantic approach taken in linguistics and logic, for example the dominant account of logical consequence is model-theoretic rather than proof-theoretic; (c) no clear inferentialist criterion for logicality has emerged; (d) it is generally recognized that one can use a logical constant in a deviant or non-standard way whilst perfectly grasping its sense, through ignorance, error, philosophical cussedness, or for some other reason. 46 Invariantists for the most part agree that logic is maximally infinite, as outlined above. In contrast, all inferentialists think that logic is finitary, many identify it with the predicate calculus, and virtually all take it to underwrite a complete logic (in the sense of 'complete' spelt out in the main text).…”

Section: Inferentialismmentioning

confidence: 90%

Logos, logic and maximal infinity

Paseau

2021

Rel. Stud.

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Recent developments in the philosophy of logic suggest that the correct foundational logic is like God in that both are maximally infinite and only partially graspable by finite beings. This opens the door to a new argument for the existence of God, exploiting the link between God and logic through the intermediary of the Logos. This article explores the argument from the nature of God to the nature of logic, and sketches the converse argument from the nature of logic to the existence of God.

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Section: Inferentialismmentioning

confidence: 90%

Logos, logic and maximal infinity

Paseau

2021

Rel. Stud.

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“…This is one consequence of ''evidence non-neutrality''-the fact that there can be rational disagreement about what the evidence is. 16 As a result, once we have gone down the road to skepticism-even if we have irrationally gone down the road to skepticism-there may be no rational way to get back.…”

Section: Quinean Meta-ontologymentioning

confidence: 97%

On Knockdown Arguments

Keller

2015

Erkenn

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Nathan Ballantyne (Erkenntnis 79, 2014) argues that the knockdown status of certain non-philosophical arguments can be transferred to arguments for substantive philosophical conclusions. Thus, if there are knockdown non-philosophical arguments, there are knockdown philosophical arguments. I show that Ballantyne's argument is unsound, since arguments that are knockdown in non-philosophical contexts may become question-begging when used to argue for philosophical conclusions.

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“…The reluctance to countenance an implausible result does not make a theory dialectically immune to counterexamples. 114 Nor, by the same token, does preemptively accepting that one's theory may have "counterintuitive consequences." 115 In all reductio arguments, some putatively implausible result counts as implausible only if the target theory is unsound.…”

Section: B Begging the Question?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The New Legal Anti-Positivism

Dindjer

2020

Legal Theory

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According to a recent wave of work by legal anti-positivists, legal norms are a subset of moral norms. This striking “one-system” view of law has rapidly become the dominant form of anti-positivism, but its implications have so far been little tested. This article argues that the one-system view leads systematically to untenable conclusions about what legal rights and obligations we have. For many clear legal norms, the view lacks the resources to explain the existence of corresponding moral norms. And its criteria for distinguishing legal norms within morality imply an under- or over-inclusive set of legal norms. I stress the special difficulties that apply beyond obligations, in the case of privileges and powers, and I show that the view's problems do not only—or mainly—concern egregiously unjust law, or indeed morally defective law at all. I close with reflections on legal normativity and the prospects for different forms of anti-positivism.

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Ch‐ch‐ch‐changes: Artists Talk About Teaching by John Reardon

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Logos, logic and maximal infinity

Logos, logic and maximal infinity

On Knockdown Arguments

The New Legal Anti-Positivism

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