Ceteris paribus conditions and the interventionist account of causality

Henschen, Tobias

doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0703-7

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 11 publications

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“…While it is essential for Woodward's account that the choice of variable sets not be arbitrary, it is difficult to see how acknowledging the importance of human concerns when choosing variable sets can be given a completely human-independent interpretation. Henschen (2015) can supplement this debate for the purposes of emphasizing the issue of subjectivity and variable choice. As mentioned above, Woodward can reject Strevens's particular formulation of the objection, referring to fine graining (i.e.…”

Section: Objectivity and Variable Setsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Projectivism, Agency, and Objectivity

Popa

2016

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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This paper examines how specific realist and projectivist versions of manipulability theories of causation deal with the problem of objectivity. Does an agent-dependent concept of manipulability (i.e., the agency theory version of causal projectivism) imply that conflicting causal claims made by agents with different capacities can come out as true? In defence of the projectivist stance taken by the agency view, I argue that if the agent's perspective is shown to be uniform across different agents, then the truth values of causal claims do not vary arbitrarily and, thus, reach a satisfactory level of objectivity. My argument connects Price's considerations on the situation of deliberation, whose structure, common to all agents, is the same with respect to both decision making and causal claims on a concept inspired by Douglas' classification of objectivity of thought processes: the perspective of the detached agent. I further argue that, despite his agent-independent concept of intervention, Woodward's claim of a stronger objectivity standard (i.e. agent-independence) cannot be achieved, as the relativity of causal concepts to a variable set brings about the issue of the agent's choice of variables. Consequently, a more permissive objectivity standard (admitting of the agent's perspective) applies to both views.On the latter view there are features to causal relations grounded into the world along with the features projected by the agent.

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Section: Objectivity and Variable Setsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Projectivism, Agency, and Objectivity

Popa

2016

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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Manipulationism,Ceteris ParibusLaws, and the Bugbear of Background Knowledge

Kowalenko

2017

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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According to manipulationist accounts of causal explanation, to explain an event is to show how it could be changed by intervening on its cause. The relevant change must be a 'serious possibility' claims Woodward 2003, distinct from mere logical or physical possibility-approximating something I call 'scientific possibility'. This idea creates significant difficulties: background knowledge is necessary for judgments of possibility. Yet the primary vehicles of explanation in manipulationism are 'invariant' generalisations, and these are not well adapted to encoding such knowledge, especially in the social sciences, as some of it is non-causal. Ceteris paribus (CP) laws or generalisations labour under no such difficulty. A survey of research methods such as case and comparative studies, randomised control trials, ethnography, and structural equation modeling, suggests that it would be more difficult and in some instances impossible to try to represent the output of each method in invariant generalisations; and that this is because in each method causal and non-causal background knowledge mesh in a way that cannot easily be accounted for in manipulationist terms. Ceteris paribusgeneralisations being superior in this regard, a theory of explanation based on the latter is a better fit for social science.

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What is macroeconomic causality?

Henschen

2017

Journal of Economic Methodology

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Ceteris paribus conditions and the interventionist account of causality

Cited by 3 publications

References 11 publications

Causal Projectivism, Agency, and Objectivity

Causal Projectivism, Agency, and Objectivity

Manipulationism,Ceteris ParibusLaws, and the Bugbear of Background Knowledge

What is macroeconomic causality?

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