CertWare: A workbench for safety case production and analysis

Barry, Matthew R.

doi:10.1109/aero.2011.5747648

Cited by 16 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…However, guarantees are not enough to infer assurance of systems at runtime, the process of argumentation //www.goalstructuringnotation.info/ 2 ASCE claims that it supports SACM 2.0 but the mappings they provide in https://www. adelard.com/asce/choosing-asce/standardisation.html are still mapping to old SACM elements 3 Autonomous cars being a typical example that leads to the claims about the safety/security of a system is needed. Hence, AssuranceCases@Runtime is necessary so that one OAS can inspect the assurance case of other OASs at runtime to conclude if they are safe to interact with.…”

Section: Sacm and Runtime System Assurancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 let strategy = Strategy to be transformed; 2 let argumentReasoning = new ArgumentReasoning; 3 argumentReasoning.name = strategy.name.equivalent(); 4 argumentReasoning.description = strategy.description.equivalent(); 5 if strategy.uninstantiated == true then 6 argumentReasoning.isAbstract = true; 7 end 8 let incomingSupportedBy = the incoming SupportedBy to strategy; 9 let outgoingSupportedBys = all outgoing SupportedBys from strategy; 10 let supportedByFromGoal = Goal from incomingSupportedBy 11 let supportedByToGoals = all Goal s from outgoingSupportedBys that connects to strategy; 12 if supportedByToGoal is not empty then -automated model validation can be performed to check the well-formedness of assurance cases.…”

Section: Algorithm 1: Transforming Rule Strategy2argumentreasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Model based system assurance using the structured assurance case metamodel

Wei

Kelly

Dai

et al. 2019

Journal of Systems and Software

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Assurance cases are used to demonstrate confidence in system properties of interest (e.g. safety and/or security). A number of system assurance approaches are adopted by industries in the safety-critical domain. However, the task of constructing assurance cases remains a manual, trivial and informal process. The Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) is a standard specified by the Object Management Group (OMG). SACM provides a richer set of features than existing system assurance languages/approaches. SACM provides a foundation for model-based system assurance, which has great potentials in growing technology domains such as Open Adaptive Systems. However, the intended usage of SACM has not been sufficiently explained. In addition, there has been no support to interoperate between existing assurance case (models) and SACM models.In this article, we explain the intended usage of SACM based on our involvement in the OMG specification process of SACM. In addition, to promote a model-based approach, we provide SACM compliant metamodels for existing system assurance approaches (the Goal Structuring Notation and Claims-Arguments-Evidence), and the transformations from these models to SACM. We also briefly discuss the tool support for model-based system assurance which helps practitioners to make the transition from existing system assurance approaches to model-based system assurance using SACM.

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Section: Sacm and Runtime System Assurancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Algorithm 1: Transforming Rule Strategy2argumentreasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Model based system assurance using the structured assurance case metamodel

Wei

Kelly

Dai

et al. 2019

Journal of Systems and Software

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“…The CertWare workbench [4] is an open-source tool 34 for creating safety cases, supporting a variety of notations and metamodels. Thus, CertWare provides a facility to create diagrams in both GSN, CAE, and the EUROCONTROL GSN [33], which is, itself, a variant of the core GSN.…”

Section: Research Toolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such graphical argument structures, can be thought of as a visual index into the safety reasoning and evidence comprising a safety case. 4 Existing tools 5 that support the development of safety arguments using the GSN or CAE [1,4,53,56,66] largely facilitate a manual development of safety cases. That is, in practice, safety case authors need to specify the arguments that connect low-level safety evidence to higher-level safety claims, and manually perform operations such as argument pattern instantiation, e.g., using copy-and-paste.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tool support for assurance case development

Denney

Pai

2017

Autom Softw Eng

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Argument-based assurance cases, often represented and organized using graphical argument structures, are increasingly being used in practice to provide assurance to stakeholders, e.g., regulatory authorities, that a system is acceptable for its intended use with respect to dependability and safety concerns. In general, comprehensive system-wide assurance arguments aggregate a substantial amount of diverse information, such as the results of safety analysis, requirements analysis, design, verification and other engineering activities. Although a variety of assurance case tools exist, many desirable operations on argument structures such as hierarchical and modular abstraction, argument pattern instantiation, and inclusion/extraction of richly structured information have limited to no automation support. To close this automation gap, over the past four years we have been developing a toolset for assurance case automation, AdvoCATE, at the NASA Ames Research Center. This paper describes how AdvoCATE is being engineered atop formal foundations for assurance case argument structures, to provide unique capabilities for: a) automated creation and assembly of assurance arguments, b) integration of formal methods into wider assurance arguments, c) automated pattern instantiation, d) hierarchical abstraction, e) queries and views, and f) verification of arguments. We (and our colleagues) have used AdvoCATE in real projects for safety assurance, in the context of unmanned aircraft systems.

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“…Safety certification relies on the demonstration that a software system is acceptably safe when it satisfies a set of objectives that the safety standards require for compliance . Some European projects, such as CESAR, SafeCer, OPENCOSS, and CertWare, have been dealing with this topic. It is also aligned with the certification of safety critical domains, and it proposes the use of safety cases …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysing encryption mechanisms and functional safety in a ROS‐based architecture

Larrucea

González-Nalda

Etxeberria‐Agiriano

et al. 2019

J Software Evolu Process

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Robot Operating System (ROS) is a middleware for connecting different components of robots. However, its use is becoming more popular in other domains such as in the automotive sector where initial prototypes have been customized and deployed in cars for demonstrating different functional purposes. Nevertheless, ROS has not been yet tested enough to be used in secure and safety environments. For example, in order to strengthen our ROS architecture, we have encrypted the messages within it. Therefore, this paper analyses the impact of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption mechanism and the functional safety of our prototype. In this sense, we are considering encrypting messages and we assess the timing constraints, as suggested by the ISO 26262, required for assuring a secure communication between components.

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CertWare: A workbench for safety case production and analysis

Cited by 16 publications

References 1 publication

Model based system assurance using the structured assurance case metamodel

Model based system assurance using the structured assurance case metamodel

Tool support for assurance case development

Analysing encryption mechanisms and functional safety in a ROS‐based architecture

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